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Abstract
Intuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind
of connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new
psychological theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and
psychological theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven,
satisficing-bounded inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test
our theory, we created a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were pre-
sented with a soritical series of objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and
spheres (Experiment 2), or both (Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related condi-
tionals embodying non-causal inferential connections (such as “If patch number 5 is blue,
then so is patch number 4”). All four experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in
which (largely determinate) responses were sensitive to parameters determining inference
strength, as well as to consequent position in the series, in a way analogous to belief bias.
Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can be suppressed, with participants
reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that this pattern can be
partly explained by a measure of inference strength. This pattern supports our theory’s
“principle of relevant inference” and “principle of bounded inference,” highlighting the
dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.
Keywords: belief bias; conditionals; dual processing; inferential semantics; relevance;
satisficing.
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1 Introduction
Conditionals are sentences of the form “If 𝜑, [then] 𝜓,” with 𝜑 called “the antecedent” and 𝜓,
“the consequent.”1 The functions of conditionals are many and varied. For instance, we use
“if ” when we want to think hypothetically about non-actual possibilities (Evans & Over, 2004);
we use “if ” to express causal relations (Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist,
1991; Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007) or probabilistic relations (Evans,
Handley, & Over, 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003); and we use “if ” to express pragmatic
functions such as inducement or advice (Beller, Bender, & Kuhnmünch, 2005; Evans, Neilens,
Handley, & Over, 2008; Fillenbaum, 1976, 1986), and to generate novel normative rules
(Elqayam, Thompson, Wilkinson, Evans, & Over, 2015). It is no wonder, then, that the study
of conditionals has engaged psychologists and philosophers alike. Without a good theory of
conditionals, we have no hope of understanding human reasoning or decision making. In
this paper, we address what is arguably themost central question in the study of conditionals,
to wit, how the antecedent connects to the consequent. Specifically, we will be concerned
with how people’s judgments of the truth values of conditionals vary as a function of the link
between antecedent and consequent.
Intuitively, when we state a conditional, we expect that the antecedent would be relevant
to the consequent. For example, there is something odd about the following conditionals:
(1) a. If Isaac Newton preferred apples over oranges, then he got his best ideas while
walking.
b. If Winston Churchill did not sleep the night before D-Day, then he considered a
career as a sculptor early on in life.
These conditionals appear odd in that the truth of their antecedent seems irrelevant to their
consequent. There is no intelligible notion of dependency in which Newton’s having gotten
his best ideas while walking could be said to have depended on whether he preferred apples
over oranges, and similarly for (1b): whether the young Churchill considered a career as a
sculptor can hardly have depended on how he slept the night before D-Day.
Although both dependency and relevance have played key roles in psychological theories of
conditionals (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 1994), there has been no systematic
effort to explore the psychological mechanisms that make sentences such as
(2) If global warming continues, then parts of England will be flooded.
seem plausible, where sentences such as (1a) and (1b) are not. In this paper, we will formulate
and support a psychological account of the relation between antecedent and consequent, to
explain why conditionals like (1a) and (1b) strike us as odd, and what this tells us about
the psychological mechanisms underlying our understanding of conditionals. To do this,
we propose a new theory that combines insights from two main theoretical accounts: the
philosophical account of inferentialism, and the psychological theory of hypothetical thinking.
Where virtually all semantics of conditionals define the truth values of conditionals as
functions of the truth values—whether in the actual world or also in other possible worlds—of
1Unless stated otherwise, “conditional” refers to indicative conditionals. Indicative conditionals are condi-
tionals whose antecedent is in the indicative mood. They are standardly contrasted with subjunctive conditionals,
whose antecedent is in the subjunctive mood. In this paper, we are only concerned with indicative conditionals,
although in Experiment 2 we address a possible subjunctive reading of some of our materials.
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the conditionals’ antecedents and consequents, inferentialism is the only semantics that makes
the existence of an inferential connection between antecedent and consequent a requirement
for the truth of a conditional. Inferentialism, in other words, builds the requirement of a
connection into themeaning of the word “if,” thereby straightforwardly accounting for the
felt oddness of conditionals such as (1a) and (1b). It is not that these conditionals appear odd
because they are semantically defective. A sentence can appear perfectly fine while still being
semantically defective—the world may simply fail to cooperate. According to inferentialism,
(1a) and (1b) appear odd because they are semantically defective for a reason that could
easily have been avoided: it is (typically) under our control to compose conditionals whose
component parts stand in an inferential relationship to one another.
Hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2006, 2007a) is a dual-process theory positing two
types of processes: fast, resource-frugal, and intuitive processes, and slow, analytic processes.
The former generate the most relevant, single mental representation; the latter can then
intervene to revise or even reject the initial representation, but this is a lazy, bounded process,
meaning that the initial representation tends to be adopted unless compelling reasons for
revision exist.
Our blend of inferentialism with dual processing, and more specifically with hypothetical
thinking theory, allows us to hypothesize that the connection between antecedent and conse-
quent is an inferential one, governed by relevance and bounded by satisficing. We state this
theory in detail in a separate section, and present evidence in its favor from four experiments.
But we begin by reviewing the main extant psychological accounts of conditionals, with some
reference along the way to relevant philosophical accounts as well.
2 Theories of conditionals
2.1 Mental model theory and the material conditional account
Philosophical theorizing about the semantics for conditionals has long been dominated by the
material conditional account, as advocated by, among others, Grice (1989), Jackson (1979),
and Lewis (1976). According to this account, the truth conditions of a conditional are those of
the corresponding material conditional: “If 𝜑, 𝜓” is false if 𝜑 is true and 𝜓 is false, and it is
true in all other cases. Although the material conditional has several advantages, it has also
been criticized for sanctioning a number of counterintuitive inferences. Most famously, it
gives rise to the so-called paradoxes of the material conditional: it validates the intuitively
invalid inference of “If 𝜑, 𝜓” from not-𝜑 (e.g., the inference of “If Bill Gates went bankrupt,
he is a billionaire” from “Bill Gates did not go bankrupt”), as well as the intuitively equally
invalid inference of “If 𝜑, 𝜓” from 𝜓 (e.g., the inference of “If Bill Gates went bankrupt, he is
a billionaire” from “Bill Gates is a billionaire”). It is fair to say that this account is no longer
considered as the received doctrine among philosophers working on conditionals.
In psychology, the state of the art is similar, in that few psychological theories formulated
past the turn of the century take the material conditional account as their starting point.
The one exception is mental model theory, in which the basic (i.e., abstract) conditional
corresponds to the material conditional (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). However, the theory
is supplemented by semantic and pragmatic modulations, so the material conditional only
applies to a limited set of conditionals. We note that mental model theory has recently been
radically revised (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015), rejecting the paradoxes of the
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material conditional, although the new theory still needs more fleshing out (Baratgin et al.,
2015).
2.2 The Ramsey test and the Equation
Except for theories belonging to the material conditional family, almost all contemporary theo-
ries of conditionals, both in psychology and in philosophy, build on the celebrated Ramsey test
(Ramsey, 1929/1990). Supported by much psychological evidence (Evans & Over, 2004), the
Ramsey test posits that we determine whether to accept a given conditional by hypothetically
adding its antecedent to our stock of beliefs, makingminimal changes (if necessary) to preserve
consistency, and from the resulting (hypothetical) perspective judging the acceptability of the
conditional’s consequent. So, to evaluate (2), we hypothetically suppose that global warming
continues, and evaluate under this supposition the acceptability that parts of England will be
flooded.
Much theorizing constructed around the Ramsey test also subscribes to the Equation,
which is suggested by the same footnote in Ramsey (1929/1990) that presents the Ramsey
test. According to the Equation, the probability of a conditional, Pr(If 𝜑, 𝜓), corresponds
to the conditional probability Pr(𝜓 | 𝜑). For example, the probability that if global warming
continues, parts of England will be flooded, is the probability of parts of England being flooded
given that global warming continues.
The one exception is Stalnaker’s (1968) possible worlds semantics, which was inspired by
the Ramsey test but does not commit to the Equation. According to Stalnaker, a conditional is
true (false) if its consequent is true (false) in the closest possible world in which its antecedent
is true—provided there is a world in which its antecedent is true; otherwise it is vacuously true.
We are not aware of any psychological theory explicitly committed to Stalnaker’s semantics,
although it is one possible interpretation of the psychological suppositional conditional, which
we describe in a separate section.
2.3 New Paradigm and the Equation
The Ramsey test and the Equation are both cornerstones of what has been dubbed “the New
Paradigm” in psychology of reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 2013; Manktelow, Over, & Elqayam,
2011; Over, 2011). The traditional paradigm in psychology of reasoning focused on binary
truth values (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Its underlying semantic theory was, fittingly,
the binary material conditional. One of the hallmarks of the New Paradigm is that this binary
approach is replaced with the more psychological focus on uncertainty and subjective degrees
of belief. In other words, reasoning in the New Paradigm is seen as Bayesian, at least to some
extent (Douven, 2016a; Elqayam & Evans, 2013).
Within the Equation-oriented camp in philosophy, there is a further distinction between
non-propositionalism, according to which conditionals do not express propositions and never
have a truth value, and the three-value view. According to the latter, a conditional is true if
it has both a true antecedent and a true consequent; false if it has a true antecedent and a
false consequent; and neither true nor false (“void,” “indeterminate”) when its antecedent
is false (Bennett, 2003; de Finetti, 1995). We are not aware of any psychological theory fully
committed to non-propositionalism; the three-value view is one of the possible semantic
interpretations underlying the psychological suppositional conditional.
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2.4 Inferentialism
According to all of the truth-conditional semantics discussed so far, a sufficient condition for
the truth of a conditional is that the conditional’s antecedent and consequent are both true,
no matter how internally unrelated these are. Thus, if Newton preferred apples over oranges
and he got his best ideas while walking, then (1a) is true according to those semantics. In
this respect, these semantics contrast sharply with the final semantics to be reviewed here, to
wit, inferentialism, which holds that, for a conditional to be true, we should be able to infer
its consequent from its antecedent (e.g., in philosophy, Barwise & Perry, 1983; Kratzer, 1986;
Mill, 1843/1872; Ramsey 1929/1990; Récanati, 2000; and in psychology, Braine, 1978; Braine
& O’Brien, 1991).
As explained in the introduction, inferentialismmakes it straightforward to account for our
intuitions concerning (1a) and (1b). Nevertheless, the inferentialist approach to the semantics
of conditionals has never enjoyed wide popularity, chiefly because critics have had no difficulty
pointing at conditionals that are pre-theoretically true, yet whose consequent is seemingly not
inferable from their antecedent. Consider, for instance,
(3) If Betty misses her bus, she will be late for the movies.
It is easy enough to imagine circumstances under which we would regard this conditional as
true, even though we can never rule out that, through some freak accident, Betty makes it to
the cinema in time even if she misses her bus.
However, this objection has force only if we interpret “inference” as meaning deductive
inference. Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven (2014) proposed a version of inferential-
ism based on a notion of inference that goes beyond deduction: the argument from antecedent
to consequent may contain not only deductive but also abductive and inductive inferential
steps, where (roughly) abductive inference is inference based on explanatory considerations
and inductive inference is inference based on statistical grounds. On this proposal,
(4) If Wilma and Fred are going to the gym together, they have settled their dispute.
may be true because, given relevant background knowledge, Wilma and Fred having settled
their dispute is the best explanation of their going to the gym together. In the same way,
(5) If Barney works hard, he will pass the exam with flying colors.
may be true because Barney is a very bright student and typically when such students work
hard for an exam, they pass it with flying colors.
For our purposes, this proposal may be summarized as stating that a conditional is true if
and only if there exists a strong enough argument leading from its antecedent plus background
knowledge to its consequent. What counts as strong enough may be subject to cognitive
and contextual variations and is beyond the scope of the present work; for now, we will stick
with a Simonian notion of satisficing (Simon, 1982) on which we will elaborate later. The
idea that arguments need not be deductively valid and that informal arguments can still be
judged for argument strength is fully compatible with the New Paradigm view of informal
argumentation and its significance (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Mercier & Sperber, 2011),
although Krzyżanowska et al. (2014) do not commit themselves to a Bayesian framework.2
2See Douven (2016b, Ch. 2) for a rebuttal of potential objections to inferentialism. For some first empirical
results in support of an inferentialist semantics, see Vidal & Baratgin (2017). Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & Barat-
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3 The suppositional conditional and the defective truth table: The
empirical evidence
As mentioned in the previous section, much relevant psychological work on conditionals has
been carried out within the framework of the New Paradigm. In this section, we review the
empirical evidence for the Ramsey test, the Equation, and the psychological theories that
accommodate them. Many contemporary psychological theories accept the Ramsey test and
the Equation as their starting point (see Evans & Over, 2004, and Oaksford & Chater, 2007, for
reviews). Evans and Over’s 2004 psychological theory of the suppositional conditional is repre-
sentative of this approach. Their proposal leaves the precise nature of the computational-level
theory open: Evans and Over suggested that psychological findings tell decisively against the
material conditional account, but can fit either Stalnaker’s semantics or three-value theories
(Baratgin, Over, & Politzer, 2013; Gilio &Over, 2012; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010; although
we note that van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Elqayam, & Over, 2014, were later able to obtain direct
empirical evidence for the Equation and against Stalnaker’s account). They do not discuss
inferentialism, but one could argue that that position offers another way of fleshing out the
thought that evaluating a conditional crucially relies on suppositional thinking. We take this
up again in the next section.
Over the last decade or so, plenty of empirical support for the Equation has accumulated
in the psychological literature, much of it coming from the probabilistic truth table task.
Participants in this task are presented with a conditional and asked to estimate its probability.
They are also given a probability distribution on the four truth table combinations (TT, TF,
FT, and FF), or are asked to generate one themselves in a separate task (Evans, Handley, &
Over, 2003; Oberauer &Wilhelm, 2003; Over et al., 2007). Almost invariably, the probability
estimates of conditionals strongly correlate with the corresponding conditional probabilities
computed on the basis of the truth table cases—which is what one expects to find if the
Equation holds true (Douven & Verbrugge, 2010, 2013; Evans & Over, 2004; Fugard, Pfeifer,
Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Gauffroy & Barrioullet, 2009; Hadjichristidis et al., 2001; Oaksford
& Chater, 2003, 2007; Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Over, Douven, & Verbrugge,
2013; Over & Evans, 2003; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010; and Politzer et al., 2010).
Of special interest to our context is the “defective” (or de Finetti) truth table (see Evans
& Over, 2004, for a review; also Over & Baratgin, 2017, and Over & and Cruz, 2017). In
this task, participants are asked to evaluate the four truth table combinations of conditional
sentences. The idea goes back to Wason (1966), the founder of modern reasoning research,
who suggested that reasoners regard the false antecedent cases as irrelevant. The defective
truth table is the one with the pattern TF##; that is to say, TT (the case in which both the
antecedent and consequent are true) is evaluated as true, TF as false, and both FT and FF
as indeterminate. This pattern is prevalent when participants are presented with arbitrary,
abstract conditionals such as “If there is a King on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on
gin (2016) suggest that the requirement of an inferential connection between antecedent and consequent may
be best accounted for in pragmatic terms. See Krzyżanowska, Collins, & Hahn (2017) for some evidence against
this suggestion. In Douven et al. (2017), we give some reasons for holding that inferentialist intuitions are best
explained as emanating from the semantics, and not from the pragmatics, of conditionals. It is probably fair
to say, though, that at the moment there is no conclusive argument in favor of either position. In any case, in
the present paper we explicitly remain noncommittal on whether inferentialist intuitions have a semantic rather
than a pragmatic origin. See also Douven and Krzyżanowska (2018) on some pitfalls of trying to distinguish
experimentally semantic from pragmatic phenomena.
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the other side.” It can also be identified with the probabilistic truth table task, and it remains
reliable when participants are asked to place bets rather than assign truth conditions (Baratgin
et al., 2013; Politzer et al., 2010). The defective truth table is related to cognitive proficiency:
the pattern becomes more prevalent with age (Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & Lecas, 2008); in adults,
it correlates with general cognitive ability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010); and it
becomes more dominant as participants accrue practice (Fugard et al., 2011).
The probabilistic truth table task (Over et al., 2007) provides some analogous findings
for thematic materials, although the comparison is not entirely straightforward. In this task,
participants are given thematic conditionals—usually causal or diagnostic conditionals—and
asked to evaluate their probability; in a separate truth table task, they are provided with each of
the truth table cases and asked to evaluate their probabilities so that they sum to 100 percent.
Typically, conditional probability computed based on evaluations of the TT and TF cases is
found to be the single strongest predictor of estimates of the probability of the conditional,
whereas measures based on the FT and FF cases—most importantly, the Δ𝑝 rule, which
measures the difference between Pr(𝜓 | 𝜑) and Pr(𝜓 | not-𝜑)—are relatively poor predictors
(see also Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014; but cf. Ohm &Thompson, 2006; Skovgaard-Olsen,
Singmann, & Klauer, 2016).
4 Toward a new psychological theory of conditionals
The previous review should make it obvious that no single existing theory covers the full
range of intuitions and psychological evidence. Specifically, inferentialism as proposed by
Krzyżanowska et al. (2014) does not cover the defective truth table; and extant psychological
theories of conditionals, such as the psychological suppositional conditional (Evans & Over,
2004), do not sufficiently cover inferentialist intuitions. Our aim in this paper is to construct
and test a psychological theory which covers both. To do this, we will draw on features from
inferentialism, combined with features taken from the psychological suppositional conditional,
and its parent theory, hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2006, 2007a; Evans & Over, 2004).
Thus, our theoretical account integrates algorithmic and computational aspects (in the sense of
Marr, 1982)—processing and representational features on the one hand, and formal (semantic
or pragmatic) features on the other hand, respectively. We call our theory “Hypothetical
Inferential Theory,” or HIT, for short.
Dual process theories of higher cognition (for reviews see Evans, 2007a, and Evans &
Stanovich, 2013) posit a qualitative difference between two types of processes: intuitive, re-
source-frugal processes (sometimes called “Type 1” or “System 1”); and analytic, effortful
processes (“Type 2” or “System 2”), which draw heavily on attentional and working memory
resources. Dual process approaches have become a mainstay of the New Paradigm in psychol-
ogy of reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2012, 2014). We will focus in
particular on hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2006, 2007a), a dual process theory that
suggests that hypothetical, effortful thinking is mainly invoked in novel situations which call
for mental simulation of possibilities. Type 1 processes focus attention on the most relevant
possibility or (epistemic) mental model (relevance principle), and only one model (singularity
principle). The ensuing mental representation is accepted as default (satisficing principle),
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unless there is a good reason to reject it—in which case Type 2 processes get involved in
revising or rejecting the default.3
According to the psychological suppositional conditional (Evans&Over, 2004), theRamsey
test involves both Type 1 and Type 2 processes. The most prominent Type 1 process involved
in it is the if-heuristic (an idea going back to Evans, 1989). This is a special case of the
relevance principle, in which the word “if ” provides a relevance cue which focuses attention
on the possibility that the antecedent is true (see also Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). The
if-heuristic thus provides the processing account of the attentional effects triggered by the
Ramsey test. This gives rise to the defective truth table, because the attentional focus on
true antecedent cases renders false antecedent cases irrelevant. Type 2 processes are invoked
when the conditional triggers hypothetical thinking, that is, mental simulation of possibilities.
The relevance principle will always play a role in generating the mental model, but Type 2
processing might be involved as well in evaluating it, especially when the situation is novel.
We propose that, for conditionals, the relevant mental representation is by default the
one in which there is an inferential relation between antecedent and consequent. As argued
in Krzyżanowska et al. (2014), this inferential link from antecedent to consequent need not
be a deductive one. We propose a psychological mechanism: According to the satisficing
principle, the link need only be strong enough, in the sense of being subjectively supported. For
example, it can be supported by informal argumentation such as described by Hahn and
Oaksford (2007; see also Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011); by heuristic or pragmatic cues,
as suggested by Evans and Over (2004); or by some form of inference to the best explanation
(Douven, 2013, 2017a, 2017b; Douven & Schupbach, 2015). On the computational level, the
semantic output of these cues often takes the shape of inductive or abductive inference, or even
deductive inference. When relevance cues fail, the result is a truth value gap, accounting for
the defective truth table. In this regard, our proposal echoes the psychological suppositional
conditional; what our theory adds is the two novel hypotheses, that relevance takes the shape of
inferential connection, and that the strength of this connection is bounded by satisficing. We
will call these “the principle of relevant inference” and “the principle of bounded inference,”
respectively.
On the computational level, our proposal is compatible with a truth value gap semantics,
in which a conditional is true if there is a strong enough argument from antecedent (plus
background knowledge) to consequent; false if there is an argument connecting antecedent
and consequent, but the argument is weak, or there is an argument (perhaps only a weak one)
from the antecedent to the negation of the consequent; and neither true nor false if there is
no inferential connection at all. (See Douven, 2016b, Ch. 2, for more on this.) We note that,
purely on the semantic level, inferentialism needs to accommodate the defective truth table
anyway, in order to achieve descriptive adequacy. Once again, whether inferentialism, thus
expanded, is tenable as a semantic theory we leave as a question for future research.
5 Experimental paradigm and hypotheses
Our theory construes the defective truth table as, in part, a product of failed inferential
relevance between antecedent and consequent. It follows that, when a relevant inferential
3Although we only explicitly draw on the relevance and satisficing principles, these principles work in tandem
with the singularity principle. Only a single relevant representation is generated, and people satisfice by sticking to
this single model unless compelled to replace it.
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Figure 5.1: Soritical color series.
connection between antecedent and consequent is certain to exist, the patterns associated with
the defective truth table should disappear or at least be substantially attenuated. To test our
hypotheses, we therefore created a novel experimental task, the soritical truth table task, in
which inferential relevance is guaranteed. Imagine that you are given a soritical series of color
patches, the patches being numbered 1 through 14 and ordered from left to right. The series
begins with a clearly blue patch—patch number 1—on the left, then gradually becomes more
greenish as one progresses to the right, with adjacent patches being almost indistinguishable in
color, and it ends with a clearly green patch—patch number 14—on the right. (See Figure 5.1.)
You are now given a conditional sentence describing a relation between two of these
patches, for example, “If patch number 6 is green, so is patch number 9.” The positions in the
series of the antecedent and consequent patches (6 and 9, respectively) jointly establish the
“direction” of the inferential connection: in this case, because the soritical series goes from
blue on the left to green on the right, the direction is (what we call) congruent, making the
conditional true, according to inferentialism. It does not matter that patch number 6 is actually
blue—that is, that the antecedent is false. The antecedent is still relevant because it provides
necessary information about the direction and distance of the inferential connection. More
generally, what we are asked to assume about any of the patches will, given what we know
about the soritical series, be relevant to what we may infer about the color of the other patches
(albeit with varying degrees of relevance). This is what we mean by “guaranteed inferential
relevance”—that what is asserted in the antecedent is always relevant to the question of the
truth of the conditional, regardless of whether the assertion is true.
The experiments we will report used soritical tasks like this one to elicit truth table judg-
ments from participants. Participants were given the usual three response options, “True” /
“False” / “Neither true nor false.” We varied the distance (either adjacent or removed) and
direction (either congruent or incongruent) of the consequent patch relative to the antecedent
patch. In Experiment 1, for control purposes, we used three different presentation modes:
verbal description only, visual presentation of soritical series throughout the test, and visual
presentation of series through explanation but not during evaluation. Experiment 2 used a
similar task, but with a different soritical series; Experiment 3 combines the two soritical series
employed in Experiments 1 and 2; and in Experiment 4 we added a separate inference strength
task. HIT generates several testable and novel predictions for this experimental paradigm,
which we now specify.
5.1 If-heuristic override hypothesis
The soritical truth table task is designed to override the if-heuristic, because the context
provides a powerful relevance cue to the contrary. Based on the principle of relevant inference,
we hypothesize that the view or description of the series, aided by a soritical uncertainty, will
focus participants’ attention on the relationship between the antecedent and consequent patch,
overriding the if-heuristic and hence directing participants’ attention away from the truth
value of the antecedent. If this is correct, we should see a minimal occurrence of defective
9
truth table patterns in our data, and overall a very low prevalence of “Neither true nor false”
responses. We explicitly test the if-heuristic override hypothesis in Experiment 3.
The if-heuristic is not without its critics; for example, Oaksford and Stenning (1992) argue
that it is descriptive rather than explanatory. Here we use the term if-heuristic in the relatively
uncontroversial sense of an attentional cue which focuses attention on the true-antecedent
cases and away from the false-antecedent ones. We take this up again in the General Discussion.
5.2 Inferential strength hypothesis: The effects of distance and direction
HIT predicts that people judge a conditional to be true when they can satisfice on a strong
enough argument leading from antecedent to consequent (relative to their background knowl-
edge). To see what the requirement of an inferential connection amounts to specifically for
the conditionals that we used as stimuli, note that there are two parameters that allow us to
make an inference from the antecedent to the consequent, to wit, direction and distance. For
instance, consider:
(6) a. If patch number 8 is green, so is patch number 11.
b. If patch number 6 is blue, so is patch number 7.
Pre-theoretically, these conditionals strike us as true. And from an inferentialist perspective,
they certainly are: (6a) because patches to the right of any given patch are greener than that
patch, so the conditional is in the “right” (i.e., congruent) direction; and (6b) because patches
number 6 and number 7 are adjacent, and so—given that adjacent patches differ almost
imperceptibly in color—whatever is true for the color of patch number 6 can reasonably be
expected to be true for the color of patch number 7.
There is a difference, however, between direction and distance.4 Direction is a deductively
valid cue: given what we know about the series, it is enough to know that patch number 8 is
green to infer that patch number 11, which is in the congruent direction, is also green. By
contrast, distance is a non-deductive cue, a parameter related to informal argument strength.
In the case of (6b), distance is a strong cue, given that, within the series, adjacent patches have
very similar colors. Specifically, on the supposition that patch number 8 is green, we have a
strong warrant to believe that patch number 7 is green, too, even though the warrant is not as
strong as in the case of (6a), in which the inferential connection is deductive in nature. Still,
the non-deductive cue in (6b) is strong enough to satisfice on. Hence, argument strength in
our experimental paradigm is operationalized as distance and direction effects—deductive
and non-deductive argument strength parameters, respectively.
Therefore, we expected direction to exert a main effect on truth evaluations of the con-
ditionals: the consequent patch would either be positioned congruently, in the direction of
the named color, strengthening the inference; or incongruently, away from the named color,
weakening the inference. We also expected a main effect of distance, working as a probabilistic
cue, such that the closer the distance between the patches, the stronger the inference, and
hence the greater the prevalence of “True” responses.
Finally, we had an exploratory hypothesis for an interaction of direction with distance. If
deductive and non-deductive cues interact, we could expect, for conditionals with the conse-
quent patch on the congruent side, more “True” responses the greater the distance between
antecedent and consequent, whereas the opposite should be observed for conditionals whose
4We thank Rakefet Ackerman for drawing our attention to this distinction.
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consequent patch is on the incongruent side. We left this hypothesis open as exploratory be-
cause we had no grounds to expect either an interaction between deductive and non-deductive
cues, or its lack thereof.
5.3 Belief bias hypothesis
If the relation between antecedent and consequent is inferential, we would also expect it to
be sensitive to the same psychological patterns that affect inferential processes in general.
One of the most prominent and well-documented effects is belief bias, the tendency to be
influenced by prior belief when drawing an inference, regardless of validity (Evans, Barston,
& Pollard, 1983; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). Prior belief has a robust effect on both
deductive and non-deductive inference (Thompson & Evans, 2012); in many if not all cases,
this effect centers on the believability of the conclusion: arguments whose conclusions are
deemed antecedently believable are more often endorsed than arguments whose conclusions
are deemed antecedently unbelievable, ceteris paribus.
Recall that HIT postulates an inferential connection, with the contextualized antecedent
playing the role of a premise of an argument and the consequent playing the role of its conclu-
sion. If participants in our task are susceptible to belief bias, we would expect them to base
their inference at times on the truth value of the consequent, regardless of the inferential con-
nection between antecedent and consequent—the analogue to belief bias in our experimental
paradigm. For example, consider this conditional:
(7) If patch number 13 is green, so is patch number 11.
It is sufficient that patch number 11 is close to the green end of the series—no real inference is
required, just considering the consequent patch position. Hence, we also expected an effect of
consequent rank (i.e., the position of the consequent patch in the soritical color series) on the
probability of judging a conditional to be true.
Belief bias is typically made up of three effects: a main effect of argument validity (or, in
the case of informal reasoning, argument strength); a main effect of believability; and a belief
× validity interaction, in which belief affects invalid (or weak) inferences more. If the analogy
holds, we should expect an interaction between believability as measured by consequent rank,
and the two argument strength parameters, distance and direction. Specifically, we would
expect consequent rank to have a stronger effect where distance and direction provide no
reliable cues to argument strength, as in the example above. (Note that this prediction is not as
strong as the prediction for a main effect of consequent rank, as at least one study—Thompson
& Evans, 2012—found no interaction effect for informal reasoning tasks.)
6 Experiment 1
6.1 Method
Participants
Seven hundred and four participants were recruited for a modest fee via the crowd-sourcing
platform CrowdFlower (http://www.crowdflower.com), which directed them to the exper-
iment on the Qualtrics platform (http://www.qualtrics.com). All participants were from
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States. Data from participants who did
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Table 6.1: Number of participants per between-participants condition.
Presentation
Description In sight Out of sight
Spread
Small 49/37 45/55 47/44
Large 43/44 39/41 46/42
Note. The first value in each cell denotes the number of participants in the blue color condition, the second value
(i.e., after the slash) the number of participants in the green color condition. (See the text for an explanation of the
factors.)
not complete the study as well as from nonnative speakers of English were excluded from the
analysis. This left us with 588 participants.
Participants in the visual presentation conditions were asked to classify the color of the
patches (more details below). The participants who were asked to classify the color (𝑁 = 397)
spent on average 381 seconds on the study (SD: 30 s); the participants in the description
condition who did not have to classify the color (𝑁 = 191) spent on average 760 seconds on
the study (SD: 408 s). (There is nothing surprising to the fact that the participants in the visual
presentation conditions, which had to answer an extra question, spent on average less time on
the study. The visual presentation of the soritical color series presented in Figure 5.1 made the
task easier.) For the analysis, we excluded from each group the fastest 5 percent responders as
well as the slowest 5 percent responders. This left us with 532 participants: 359 in the visual
presentation conditions, and 173 in the description condition. Of these 532 participants, 427
had a university education, while 105 had only a high school or secondary school education.
The mean age of the participants was 34 years (±13). The remaining analysis and description
is based on those 532 participants. The attrition rate (24 percent) is not unusual for web-based
studies.
Design
We used a 3 × 2 × 2 between-participants design with three levels of color series presentation
(“description,” “in sight,” and “out of sight”), two levels of consequent spread (“small” and
“large”), and two levels of color (“blue” and “green”), resulting in twelve groups in total.
Participants were randomly assigned to the groups. The number of participants per group is
given in Table 6.1. Each participant judged 22 conditionals, described in more detail below,
with different values of direction and distance.
The color condition determined the value of𝑋 in schematic sentence (8) below and was
consistent for all conditionals. Thus, participants in the green condition were presented with
conditionals which consistently referred to green, and participants in the blue condition were
presented with conditionals which consistently referred to blue.
The 22 conditionals per participant resulted from a not fully orthogonal combination of
three within-subject factors antecedent, direction, and range. We used six different values for
the antecedent 𝑖 in (8): 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13. For each of those antecedents, we presented
either three (for antecedents 2 and 13) or four (for the remaining antecedents 7, 8, 9, and 10)
different consequent values 𝑗. More specifically, for the latter four antecedents we presented
two consequents in the congruent direction (the consequent patch to the left, bluer side of the
antecedent patch in the blue condition and to the right, greener side of the antecedent patch
in the green condition) and two consequents in the incongruent direction (the consequent
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patch to the right of the antecedent patch in the blue condition and to the left of the antecedent
patch in the green condition). For one of the congruent patches in each direction the range
was “near” whereas for the other the range was “far.” The near range was always 1 step away.
The value of the far range depended on the spread between-participants condition. In the
small spread condition, the far patch was 2 steps away, whereas in the large spread condition,
the far patch was 3 steps away. Note that for the two outer antecedents (i.e., 2 and 13) the far
patches could not be realized for all directions (e.g., a patch to the left of 2 that is either 2 or 3
steps away would be outside of the color series).
To illustrate the design, three of the twelve groups—participants in the green color and
small spread conditions—received conditionals of the forms “If patch number 𝑖 is green, so is
patch number 𝑖 − 1,” “If patch number 𝑖 is green, so is patch number 𝑖 − 2,” “If patch number 𝑖
is green, so is patch number 𝑖 + 1,” and “If patch number 𝑖 is green, so is patch number 𝑖 + 2,”
for 𝑖 ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10}; for 𝑖 = 2, they received conditionals of the first, third, and fourth forms (i.e.,
𝑖 − 1, 𝑖 + 1, and 𝑖 + 2); and for 𝑖 = 13, they received conditionals of the first, second, and third
form (i.e., 𝑖 − 1, 𝑖 − 2, and 𝑖 + 1). The 22 conditionals were presented on the same screen in an
individually randomized order.
The presentation condition determined how participants were presented with the color se-
ries. Close to one third of the participants—the participants in the description condition—only
received the following description:
Imagine a series of 14 color patches, numbered 1 through 14, and ordered from
left to right. The series begins with a clearly blue patch—patch number 1—on
the left. The patches then gradually become more greenish as we progress to the
right, with adjacent patches being almost indistinguishable in color. The series
ends with a clearly green patch—patch number 14—on the right.
Participants in the two visual presentation conditions—the in sight and out of sight condi-
tions—were shown the series of color patches displayed in Figure 5.1. For the participants in
the in sight condition, the series was left in sight while they evaluated the conditionals. The
participants in the out of sight condition were shown the series at the beginning but it was no
longer in sight when they evaluated the conditionals; there was also no possibility for those
participants to return to the screen with the color series. The series was presented in constant
order, always from the blue left to the green right.
Materials and procedure
All materials were in English, the participants’ native language, and shown on screen. Partici-
pants were asked to evaluate conditionals about the series of fourteen color patches shown in
Figure 5.1. The colors of the patches in that series were chosen along a constant line of lightness
𝐿 = 30 and such that there is a subjective separation between adjacent patches of Δ𝐸∗ = 11.2
as measured in CIELUV coordinates (see Fairchild, 2013, for details). The conditionals that
participants were asked to judge were all of the form
(8) If patch number 𝑖 is𝑋, so is patch number 𝑗.
Participants were presented with three response options to judge the truth of each conditional,
“True,” “False,” and “Neither true nor false.”
All 359 participants who had been shown the series of color patches (i.e., participants in
the in sight and out of sight conditions) were asked to classify the colors in the soritical series
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Figure 6.1: For each patch, the number of participants that classified the patch as blue, green,
and borderline. (Intermediate values have been interpolated and connected with a smooth
line.)
in a separate task, after they had evaluated the conditionals. They were shown the color series
again, and on the same screen were asked to indicate of each patch whether it was blue, green,
or borderline blue/green, again in an individually randomized order. The responses to this
question are displayed in Figure 6.1.
Statistical analysis
To test the predictions fromHIT, we used two variables, direction and distance, where direction
had two levels, “congruent” and “incongruent,” and distance was determined by spread and
range: When range was near, distance was always 1, independent of the value of the spread
factor; when range was far, distance was either 2 (if spread was small) or 3 (if spread was
large). Thus, distance varied both within and between participants, as range was varied within
participants (i.e., participants saw both items in near and far range) and spread between
participants (i.e., it was either small or large). As we did not specifically predict a linear or
quadratic trend of distance, we treated distance as a categorical variable. For reasons given
below, we compared HIT with models predicting effects of either consequent alone or of
antecedent and consequent together. For these models, we used numeric variables with the
patch number of antecedent and/or consequent centered at the midpoint of the scale.
Including all four independent variables describing the within-participants design (i.e.,
direction, distance, antecedent, and consequent) in one analysis was not possible as they are
collinear; formally speaking, the matrix of a model with all four independent variables would
be rank deficient. However, both a model with antecedent and consequent as independent
variables and amodel with direction, distance, and either antecedent or consequent as indepen-
dent variables is perfectly possible. In addition to this, either type of model contains different
information in the independent variables. Choosing between antecedent and consequent for
the latter model only leads to a different parameterization of an otherwise equivalent model.
Consequently, the results section is split into two parts: in the first, we compare the HIT
model with two independently motivated models employing a model selection approach (e.g.,
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Zucchini, 2000); in the second part, we investigate the HIT model further to assess whether
the specific predictions are supported.
We analyzed our data using two binomial variables. In a first step, we only considered
“Neither true nor false” versus other responses. In a second step, we only considered the
other responses from the first step analyzing “True” versus “False” responses (i.e., excluding
trials with “Neither true versus false” responses). In this way, we transformed a multinomial
variable with three categories into two binomial variables (i.e., we analyzed the data as nested
dichotomies; Fox, 2008). However, our design presented another statistical challenge. The
models we compared all predict effects of within-participants variables such as antecedent or
consequent patch or direction, which prohibits the use of standard statistical procedures for
binomial variables such as logistic regression or 𝜒2-tests. These standard procedures assume
independent and identically distributed responses, an assumption violated for within-subject
factors. To overcome this problem, we employed an analysis based on generalized linear mixed
models (GLMM; e.g., Jaeger, 2008), a type of repeated-measures logistic regression (see the
supplemental materials for details).
We relegate a thorough discussion of the presentation factor (with levels “description,”
“in sight,” and “out of sight”) to the supplemental materials, as its effect on the results did
not affect the conclusions. Our analysis was performed on the 532 × 22 = 11,704 individual
responses.
6.2 Results and discussion
6.2.1 Indeterminate responses
Overall, participants classified 49.1 percent of the conditionals as true, 40.4 percent as false, and
10.5 percent as neither true nor false. However, the aggregate value for “Neither true nor false”
does not adequately reflect the interindividual variability for the indeterminate responses,
as 55 percent of the participants never chose this response option. Figure 6.2 displays the
distribution of the individual response proportions showing this clearly. Furthermore, only
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Figure 6.2: Histogram of individual response proportions of Experiment 1.
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Table 6.2: Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment
1.
Model 𝐾𝑓 𝐾𝑟 LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
HIT 72 8/28 −3746.02 7708.03 0.00 8491.77 0.00
Consequent 24 2/1 −5526.32 11106.64 3398.61 11302.58 2810.80
Antecedent–consequent 48 4/6 −4156.75 8429.49 721.46 8850.39 358.62
Note. 𝐾𝑓 is the number of fixed effect parameters,𝐾𝑟 the number of random effect parameters (number of random
slopes + random intercept/number of correlations among random effects), and LL the maximum log-likelihood
of each model. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion and BIC the Bayesian Information Criterion, two indices
for model selection that take model fit (i.e., −2 × LL) and model complexity (i.e., number of estimated parameters,
and for BIC also sample size) into account. ΔAIC and ΔBIC are the values for each model minus the smallest
AIC or BIC value. Models with smaller indices provide a more parsimonious (i.e., better) description of the data.
one out of 532 participants always responded with “Neither true nor false” (four participants
always responded with “True” and five always with “False”). The results are even more striking
when we examine specifically the false antecedent cases, the cases traditionally evaluated as
indeterminate in classic truth table tasks. This is possible for the participants in the visual test
conditions, who were also asked to classify the color patches as “green,” “blue,” or “borderline.”
Out of 1915 responses to conditionals with false antecedents, only 116 (6 percent) were
indeterminate. These results strongly agree with our if-heuristic override hypothesis.
6.2.2 “True” versus “False” responses
Our main interest was the predictions concerning the rates of “True” versus “False” responses.
Mean response proportions as a function of the independent variables relevant for HIT are
displayed in Figure 6.3. An eyeball test seems to confirm an effect of both inference strength
and belief bias in line with the predictions of HIT.
Model selection. We started by fitting a GLMM for HIT, which included the variables deemed
relevant: fixed effects for direction, distance, and consequent, plus all their interactions. We
also fitted a consequent-only model, to represent pure belief bias effects, and an antecedent–
consequent model, to represent a generic non-inferential semantic approach, based purely
on the truth values of antecedent and consequent (see Section 2). For a fair comparison, all
models contained fixed effects for the control variables color, presentation, and spread (where
possible) plus full interactions with the relevant variables (note that the presence or absence of
these variables did not affect the conclusions).
Model selection results are displayed in Table 6.2 and were straightforward. As could be
expected from the descriptive results, the HIT model provided the clearly best account in
terms of both AIC and BIC.5 While the antecedent–consequent model provided the second
best account, its performance was dramatically worse with ΔAIC = 721.
Analysis of HIT model. Next we tested the specific predictions of HIT. To this end, we
estimated 𝑝-values for all effects of the HIT model (the full results can be found in Table 1
in the supplemental materials). The inferential strength hypothesis was supported by a main
effect of direction, 𝜒2(1) = 201.66, 𝑝 < .0001, indicating that conditionals with consequent
5Because we do not assume that the true model is among our candidate models, we have a preference for AIC
over BIC (see Yang, 2005).
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Figure 6.3: Data relevant to HIT predictions concerning “True” versus “False” judgments
(excluding all “Neither true nor false” responses) as a function of consequent (on the 𝑥-axis),
distance between antecedent and consequent (increasing across columns from left to right),
and direction (consequent patches on the congruent side are displayed in the upper panels,
consequent patches on the incongruent side in the lower panels). Due to the mixed within-
/between-participants nature of distance, the leftmost column with distance 1 is based on the
same number of data points as the two other columns combined. (The supplemental materials
contains a version of this figure that includes the “Neither true nor false” responses [Figure 1]
and versions that separate the presentation modes [Figures 2–4].)
patches on the congruent side were almost unanimously judged to be true (estimated marginal
mean on the response scale [EMM] = .93),6 whereas conditionals with consequent patches
on the incongruent side were judged to be true in less than 20 percent of the cases (EMM =
.18). We found the predicted main effect of distance, 𝜒2(2) = 80.00, 𝑝 < .0001, indicating
that conditionals with consequent patches one step away (EMM = .86) were more likely to
be judged “True” than conditionals with consequent patches two steps away (EMM = .60,
odds ratio [OR] = 4.26, 𝑧 = 6.24, 𝑝 < .0001), which in turn were more likely to be judged
6Marginal means were estimated at the midpoint of consequent (i.e., at 7.5).
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Figure 6.4: Three-way interaction of direction × color × consequent of HIT model for “True”
versus “False” responses. The black lines show the predictions based on the fixed effects. The
gray lines in the background show the predictions of the individual random effects from all
532 participants; these are plotted with 50 percent transparency so that darker lines represent
more participants.
“True” than conditionals with consequent patches three steps away (EMM = .35, OR = 2.70,
𝑧 = 4.46, 𝑝 < .0001). The exploratory prediction of interaction of direction with distance was
not supported, 𝜒2(2) = 0.50, 𝑝 = .78.
We also found strong support for the predicted belief bias effect. First, we found the
analogue of the main effect of belief, an effect of consequent (i.e., an interaction of consequent
with color), 𝜒2(1) = 356.10, 𝑝 < .0001. The slope in the blue condition was clearly negative,
𝑏blue = −0.86, 95% CI [−0.99, −0.73], whereas the slope in the green condition was clearly
positive, 𝑏green = 0.71, 95% CI [0.59, 0.83]. Second, we also found evidence for an analogue of
the believability × validity interaction, namely, that the effect of consequent was stronger for
weaker inferences as indicated by a significant three-way interaction of direction × color ×
consequent, 𝜒2(1) = 7.69, 𝑝 = .006. Follow-up analyses further confirmed the predictions:
the slopes for consequent in the congruent conditions (𝑏blue = −0.76, 95% CI [−0.92, −0.59],
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and 𝑏green = 0.61, 95% CI [0.47, 0.75]) tended to be smaller than the slopes in the incongruent
conditions (𝑏blue = −0.97, 95% CI [−1.13, −0.81], and 𝑏green = 0.80, 95% CI [0.65, 0.95]), both
|𝑧| > 2.1, both 𝑝 = .055. Figure 6.4 shows the fixed and random effects model estimates of this
interaction which reveal that, although there is considerable individual variation, the pattern
was quite consistent.7 Given the absence of the direction × distance interaction, the absence
of the predicted direction × distance × color × consequent interaction, 𝜒2(2) = 3.09, 𝑝 = .21,
was entirely unsurprising.
7 Experiment 2
Consider the following sentences:
(9) a. If Dino wins the lottery, he will quit his job.
b. If Dino were to win the lottery, he would quit his job.
c. If Dino had won the lottery, he would have quit his job.
Of these sentences, (9a) is ordinarily classified as an indicative conditional while (9b) and
(9c) are classified as subjunctives, with (9c) counting as a special kind of subjunctive, usually
called “counterfactual,” given that it pragmatically implicates its antecedent (and in fact also
its consequent) to be false. As stated at the outset (note 1), the present paper is exclusively
concerned with indicative conditionals.8
However, consider
(10) If patch number 2 is green, so is patch number 3.
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, virtually all participants in the in-sight and out-of-sight conditions
judged patch number 2 to be blue; and the participants in the description condition will, based
on the information they were provided, have had the reasonable expectation that this patch was
blue. So, although (10) is, like all conditionals in our materials, grammatically an indicative
conditional, there is a legitimate concern that at least some participants will have read it and
other conditionals with clearly false antecedents as counterfactuals and thus as subjunctives,
and that this reading may have affected the outcomes of Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 was designed to address this concern, by using a soritical series which does
not allow the attribution with any certainty of truth values to the antecedents or consequents of
7Taking a step back from the predictions, inspection of Figure 6.4 also reveals a main effect of color, 𝜒2(1) =
15.47, 𝑝 < .0001, as the 𝑦-axis position with which the midpoint of consequent is crossed differs between the blue
and the green condition. In other words, the probability of a “True” response at the midpoint is higher in the blue
(EMM = .74) than in the green condition (EMM = .50). This effect is a consequence of the perceived asymmetry of
the color series in the visual presentation conditions, as is evident from Figure 6.1. Hence, it can be explained
by a color × presentation interaction, 𝜒2(2) = 13.29, 𝑝 = .001. Follow-up contrasts on the interaction revealed
the to-be-expected pattern: While the difference between the blue and the green condition is significant in the
two visual presentation conditions (EMMin-sight = .76 and .34; EMMout-of-sight = .73 and .35), both OR > 5.1, both
𝑝 < .0006, no such effect was observed in the description condition, in which no asymmetry could be expected
(EMM = .74 and .79), OR = 0.74, 𝑝 = .51. Note that this interaction also subsumed a main effect of presentation,
𝜒2(2) = 11.88, 𝑝 = .003.
8As noted in Douven (2016b), it may not take too much effort to tweak inferentialism—one of the main pillars
of HIT—to make it apply to indicative and subjunctive conditionals alike. Thus generalized, inferentialism might
well serve as a foundation for a version of HIT that covers subjunctive conditionals as well. Here, however, we flag
a possible extension of HIT in this direction only as an avenue for future research.
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Figure 7.1: Soritical series of spheres.
the conditionals concerning the series. Instead of a series of color patches, we used the series of
spheres shown in Figure 7.1, where the context provided only information sufficient to judge
the relative rather than absolute sizes of the spheres; all conditionals we used were to the effect
that if a given sphere in the series was large, then so was another given sphere in the series.
The context did not support a counterfactual interpretation of these conditionals, given that
neither the conditionals’ antecedents nor their consequents could be said to be false with any
degree of confidence. For example, although sphere number 14 is clearly larger than sphere
number 13, it is impossible to say that it is large—for all we know, all 14 spheres are exceedingly
small, having been produced by a miniaturist artist under a microscope. Nevertheless, the
series still supports inferential connections between the antecedent and consequent of the
relevant conditionals.
7.1 Predictions
Our predictions were similar to the ones we had in Experiment 1, albeit with some differences.
We predicted a replication of the inferential strength effect, articulated as main effects of
direction and distance. We left the distance× direction interaction as an exploratory hypothesis
again. We also predicted a consequent effect (our belief bias analogue), although we expected
it not to be as strong as in Experiment 1. This is because sphere size in this series is purely
relative, and none of the spheres can be said to be small or large; hence, there is little belief
to bias the inference. As a minor prediction, we predicted a consequent × direction effect, a
replication of the same effect from Experiment 1. As before, this prediction is less firm because
believability × validity interaction is not universal in belief bias.
7.2 Method
Participants
Fifty-six participants were recruited in the samemanner as in Experiment 1. We excluded from
analysis data from the 5 percent slowest and 5 percent fastest participants, then fromnon-native
speakers of English, participants who did not have normal or corrected to normal vision, color
blind or dyslexic participants, and participants who failed either of two validation questions.
The first validation question (following Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014)
appeared at the end of the demographic section. Participants were given a list of hobbies and
were asked, “Below is a list of hobbies. If you are reading these instructions please write ‘I read
the instructions’ in the ‘other’ box.” Data from participants who left the box empty or specified
hobbies were excluded. The second validation question, taken fromAust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich,
andMusch (2014) was placed at the end of the study, and asked participants to state if they had
responded seriously to the questions in the experiment. We excluded data from participants
who responded with a “no.” Lastly, we excluded data from participants who participated
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Figure 7.2: Histogram of individual response proportions of Experiment 2.
in the study using a handheld device such as a smartphone (information about the device
was obtained from their browser information, provided by Qualtrics). This left us with 39
participants. These participants spent on average 302 seconds on the experiment (SD: 100 s).
Thirty of them had a university education and 9 had only a high school or secondary school
education. Their mean age was 41 years (±11).
Design and materials
We used the soritical series of 14 spheres shown in Figure 7.1. Participants were given the
following instructions:
At the top of the screen you see a series of 14 spheres. These spheres are all aligned,
one lying next to the other. Imagine that you see the spheres from an unknown
distance. They can be very far away or quite nearby, although all are the same
distance from you. You do not know anything about the absolute size of these
spheres.
We used a slightly simplified version of the design in Experiment 1, with only the in-sight visual
condition, and (obviously) no manipulation of color. Antecedent spheres were in position 2,
7, 8, 9, 10 or 13; for each antecedent sphere, the consequents were +/−1 and +/−3 (with the
exception of antecedent spheres 3 and 12, for which −3 and +3 were impossible, respectively).
Participants were presented with the full set of 22 items on the same page in an individually
randomized order.
7.3 Results and discussion
7.3.1 Indeterminate responses
Overall, participants classified 58.2 percent of the conditionals as true, 27.4 percent as false,
and 14.5 percent as neither true nor false. Again, only one of the 39 participant always
responded with “Neither true nor false” while the majority never used this response (two
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Table 7.1: Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 2.
Model 𝐾𝑓 𝐾𝑟 LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
HIT 8 8/28 −178.59 445.18 0.00 647.51 115.32
Consequent 2 2/1 −380.99 771.99 326.81 794.98 262.79
Antecedent–consequent 4 4/6 −219.91 467.81 22.63 532.19 0.00
Note. See Table 6.2. The apparent better performance of the antecedent–consequent model compared to HIT in
terms of BIC is a consequence of the correlation parameters among random effects and the large penalty provided
by BIC for each parameter. After removing those correlations, HIT provides the best account in terms of both
AIC, ΔAIC > 150, and BIC, ΔBIC > 110. This suggests that, given the modest sample size, estimating correlations
among random slopes is not completely justifiable (see also Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015).
participants always respondedwith “True” and zero alwayswith “False”). Figure 7.2 displays the
distribution of the individual response proportions. The pattern shown broadly replicates that
of Experiment 1, supporting our if-heuristic override hypothesis. The rate of indeterminate
responses was slightly higher in this experiment, perhaps because a sizable minority (12
participants) never used “False” as response.
7.3.2 “True” versus “False” responses
Ourmain analysis again concerned the rate of “True” versus “False” responses, asHIT predicted
a unique pattern. Mean response proportions as a function of the independent variables are
displayed in Figure 7.3.
Eyeball inspection of the Figure reveals that the results conceptually replicate those of
Experiment 1 (Figure 6.3), although the pattern differs in some respects. On the one hand,
consequent effects seem considerably weaker here; on the other hand, direction effects seem at
least equally strong or even stronger. Furthermore, there seems to be evidence for a distance ×
direction interaction: the distance effect seems strong in the incongruent direction, but absent
in the congruent direction.
Model selection. In the first step we compared again three GLMMs: a model for HIT (with fixed
effects for direction, distance, consequent, and all interactions), a consequent model (with
consequent as its only fixed effect), and an antecedent–consequent model (with antecedent,
consequent, and their interaction as fixed effects). Results are displayed in Table 7.1. In line
with the eyeball inspection of Figure 7.3, the HIT model provides the clearly best account,
ΔAIC > 22.
Analysis of HIT model. Next we tested for the specific predictions of HIT.9 In support of the
inferential strength hypothesis, we found a very strong main effect of direction, 𝜒2(1) = 34.76,
𝑝 < .0001, OR > 1000, indicating that conditionals with consequent spheres on the congruent
side were unanimously judged to be true (EMM = 1.00), while those on the incongruent side
were only judged as true in about a fifth of the cases (EMM = .22). The effect of distance was
also present, but less pronounced, 𝜒2(1) = 6.15, 𝑝 = .01, OR = 7.35. Consequent spheres one
step away (EMM = .98) were more likely to be judged “True” than consequent spheres three
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Figure 7.3: Data from Experiment 2 relevant to HIT predictions concerning “True” versus
“False” judgments (excluding all “Neither true nor false” responses) as a function of consequent
(on the 𝑥-axis), distance between antecedent and consequent, and direction. (Figure 8 in the
supplemental materials is a version of this figure that includes the “Neither true nor false”
responses.)
steps away (EMM = .89). As in Experiment 1, we did not find strong evidence for the direction
× distance interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 3.32, 𝑝 = .07 (but see below).
We again found support for the predicted belief bias effect, but as expected, it was less strong
than in Experiment 1, 𝜒2(1) = 8.27, 𝑝 = .004, 𝑏 = 0.26, 95% CI [0.10, 0.43]. Furthermore, we
again found the analogue to the validity × believability interaction, the direction × consequent
interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 10.61, 𝑝 = .001. The effect of consequent (i.e., “believability”) was absent
for congruent (i.e., “valid”) spheres, 𝑏 = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.18, 0.24], but clearly present for
incongruent (i.e., “invalid”) spheres, 𝑏 = 0.49, 95% CI [0.25, 0.73].
In addition, we also found a three-way interaction of direction × distance × consequent,
𝜒2(1) = 10.90, 𝑝 = .001. This interaction is displayed in Figure 7.4 and more clearly exhibits
the pattern discussed above. The belief bias effect of consequent seems to appear only for
9This analysis is based on the HIT model without correlation among random slopes as we were unable to
reliably obtain 𝑝-values for the model including correlations (see, e.g., Bates et al., 2015). See supplemental
materials Table 3 for full results.
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Figure 7.4: Three-way interaction of direction × distance × consequent of HIT model for
“True” versus “False” responses of Experiment 2. The black lines show the predictions based
on the fixed effects. The gray lines in the background show the predictions of the individual
random effects from all 39 participants; these are plotted with 50 percent transparency so that
darker lines represent more participants.
“invalid and improbable” spheres, that is, those which are neither in the congruent direc-
tion nor only one step away. Specifically, the effect of consequent is only significantly above
zero for incongruent spheres with distance 3, 𝑏 = 0.84, 95% CI [0.43, 0.1.25]. For congru-
ent spheres with distance 3, the effect of consequent is virtually zero, 𝑏 = −0.08, 95% CI
[−0.38, 0.22]. For spheres with distance 1, the estimated effect of consequent is 𝑏 = 0.14 for
both congruency conditions, with 95% CI [−0.14, 0.42] for congruent spheres and 95% CI
[−0.06, 0.34] for incongruent spheres. The reason for the apparent difference between the two
distance 1 conditions is a different intercept (i.e., EMM). The EMMs for the four conditions
are EMMcong1 = 1.00, EMMcong3 = 1.00, EMMincong1 = .58, and EMMincong3 = 0.05.
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Figure 8.1: Task structure for Experiment 3. Participants were shown the above while being
given conditionals of two main types: conditionals with both antecedent and consequent
within a single series (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then patch D is blue”; “If sphere 1 is large, then
sphere 4 is large”); and conditionals in which the antecedent and the consequent were between
the series (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then sphere 4 is large”; “If sphere 1 is large, then patch D is
blue”). Relevance is guaranteed for within-series but not for between-series conditionals.
8 Experiment 3
According to our if-heuristic override hypothesis, the soritical truth-table task provides a
strong cue to the guaranteed relevance of the antecedent even when the antecedent is false. This
leads to a prediction of an unusually low proportion of indeterminate responses, compared to
field benchmarks. Experiments 1 and 2 provided strong evidence for this hypothesis, with
a very low proportion of indeterminate responses. However, Experiments 1 and 2 did not
provide a control condition with no guaranteed relevance. The aim of Experiment 3 was to test
our predictions against a control condition with a comparable task which nevertheless does
not guarantee the relevance of the antecedent, providing a more robust test of the if-heuristic
override hypothesis. Thus, Experiment 3 is a direct test of HIT’s principle of relevant inference.
To create a control condition, we presented participants with the same soritical truth-table
task, but instead of a single soritical series we combined the colored patches series used in
Experiment 1 with the spheres series used in Experiment 2. (See Figure 8.1.)
In the experimental conditions, participants were presented with conditionals whose
antecedent and consequent were within a single series; for the control conditions, participants
were presented with conditionals whose antecedent and consequent were between series. So
we had two main test conditions articulated through four types of conditionals:
1. Within-series conditionals (experimental condition; guaranteed relevance):
(a) within-series colors–colors (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then patch D is blue”);
(b) within-series spheres–spheres (e.g., “If sphere 1 is large, then sphere 4 is large”).
2. Between-series conditionals (control condition; no guaranteed relevance):
(a) between-series colors–spheres (e.g., “If patch A is blue, then sphere 4 is large”);
(b) between-series spheres–colors (e.g., “If sphere 1 is large, then patch D is blue”).
In the between-series control condition, in which participants had to infer from an an-
tecedent in one series to a consequent in another series, relevance of the antecedent to the
consequent was blocked. By contrast, the within-series experimental conditions required
participants to infer within the same soritical series, so that relevance was guaranteed. More-
over, to suppress relevance more effectively, the direction in each series was contralateral: for
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the colors series the congruent direction was right-to-left (i.e., color terms always referred to
“blue”), whereas for the spheres series the congruent direction was left-to-right (i.e., sphere
terms always referred to “large”). Hence, participants could not draw inference from one series
to another merely by analogy to the number of required steps in the other series. Thus, for the
within-series condition we expected a replication of the pattern we identified in Experiments
1 and 2, whereas for the between-series condition we expected participants to revert to the
defective truth-table pattern typically observed in the field.
8.1 Predictions
Our main prediction concerned the if-heuristic override. The manipulation we introduced
was designed so that the between-series condition would suppress the strong relevance cue
delivered by the use of the soritical series, while this cue would be largely preserved in the
within-series condition. Furthermore, in the between-series condition we blocked participants
from any quick-and-easy ways to infer from antecedent to consequent. Therefore, we expected
participants to resort in that condition to the usual pattern observed for abstract conditionals,
namely the defective truth table (TF##), perhaps with aminority conforming to the conjunctive
pattern (TFFF) as found in previous studies (e.g., Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm,
2003). By contrast, we expected the proportion of indeterminate responses in the within-series
condition to remain comparable to that of the previous two experiments. The main prediction
for Experiment 3 was therefore that the proportion of indeterminate responses would be
significantly higher in the between-series condition relative to the within-series condition.
The defective truth table means that the rate of indeterminate responses in the between-
series condition should be a function of the truth of the antecedent: where the antecedent
is false or indeterminate, the conditional should be evaluated as indeterminate (e.g., Evans
& Over, 2003; Baratgin, Over, & Politzer, 2013). As an illustration, see Figure 6.1. As the
antecedent progresses from left to right, patches are predominantly evaluated first as blue
(= “True”), then as neither blue nor green (= “Indeterminate”), and finally as green (= “False”).
Thus, we predicted that the proportion of indeterminate responses in the between-series
conditions would increase as a function of antecedent rank when moving toward the “False”
end of the scale—that is, toward the green end of the scale in the colors–spheres condition,
and toward the smaller end of the scale in the spheres–colors condition.
We also had auxiliary predictions for the pattern of determinate responses. Broadly, we
expected a replication of the pattern in Experiments 1 and 2 for the within-series condition:
main effects of distance, direction, and consequent. However, even for the within-series
condition, the situation is somewhat more complex relative to Experiments 1 and 2, because
the second series is always in sight and might provide misleading cues. For the between-series
condition, participants were likely to create ad-hoc heuristics to reduce the cognitive load,
but we had no way to know in advance what these heuristics might be. We therefore left
predictions for the determinate responses in this experiment exploratory.
8.2 Method
Participants
One hundred and seventy-three participants were recruited the same way as in the previous
experiments. We used the same validation measures and exclusion criteria as in Experiment 2,
which left us with 116 participants. These participants spent on average 481 seconds on the
26
experiment (SD: 158 s). Ninety of them had a university education and 26 had only a high
school or secondary school education. Their mean age was 39 years (±11).
Design and materials
The experiment was a combination of Experiments 1 (“in-sight” condition) and 2. In each trial,
participants always saw both the soritical color patches series on top and the soritical series of
spheres right underneath it, as shown in Figure 8.1. The soritical series of color patches was
labeled from A to N instead of from 1 to 14 (as it was in Experiment 1), so that all patches and
spheres would have different labels. Color terms always referred to “blue” and sphere terms
always referred to “large”.
Each participant was presented with a total of 24 conditionals in two main relevance
conditions: 12 conditionals in the within-series condition (guaranteed relevance), in which
the conditional referred to only one of the two soritical series; and 12 conditionals in the
between-series condition (no guaranteed relevance control condition), in which the conditional
referred to one of the soritical series in the antecedent and to the other one in the consequent.
For the 12 conditionals in each condition the consequent patches/spheres were in position 4,
8, and 11 (or D, H, and K); for each consequent patch sphere, the antecedents were +/−1 and
+/−3. This resulted in a balanced design for the HIT relevant factors distance and direction.
Between-participants we manipulated the type of soritical series in the within-series (1a
or 1b) and between-series (2a or 2b) conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of four groups:
⋄ Within-series conditionals: colors (condition 1a); between-series conditionals: col-
ors–spheres (condition 2a);𝑁 = 24.
⋄ Within-series conditionals: colors (condition 1a); between-series conditionals: sphe-
res–colors (condition 2b);𝑁 = 37.
⋄ Within-series conditionals: spheres (condition 1b); between-series conditionals: col-
ors–spheres (condition 2a);𝑁 = 25.
⋄ Within-series conditionals: spheres (condition 1b); between-series conditionals: sphe-
res–colors (condition 2b);𝑁 = 30.
The levels of the direction variable for the within-series conditions were defined as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, respectively. Specifically, in condition 1a (colors–colors) consequent patches
on the left (i.e., bluer) side of the antecedent were considered congruent (and incongruent
otherwise) and in condition 1b (spheres–spheres) consequent patches on the right (i.e., larger)
side of the antecedent were considered congruent (and incongruent otherwise). Thus, for
example, the item “If patch E is blue, so is patch D” is congruent; similarly, the item “If sphere
5 is large, so is sphere 6” is also congruent.
Note that the congruent direction for the color patches series is from right to left, whereas
the congruent direction for the spheres series is from left to right. As previouslymentioned, this
was a deliberate choice whose aim was to suppress relevance by severing connections between
the series. Since congruency is defined by the relation between antecedent and consequent,
and since this connection is deliberately disrupted in the between-series condition, this means
that defining direction in the between-series conditions is less straightforward than in the
within-series conditions. It is only possible to define direction analogously, either based on
the antecedent patch or based on the consequent patch. For example, in the conditional “If
patch E is blue, then sphere 6 is large”, the congruent direction based on the consequent is
left-to-right, whereas based on the antecedent it would be right-to-left. While either direction
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is equally philosophically plausible, psychological plausibility in this case calls for defining
between-series conditionals based on the consequent. Recall that Experiments 1 and 2 found
strong evidence for a belief bias analogue, that is, for amain effect of the consequent rank. Thus,
in the soritical paradigm the consequent provides a strong heuristic cue to the truth value of
the conditional. For the between-series conditions, then, we defined congruency analogously,
based on the position of the consequent patch, so that congruency in each between-series
condition was defined according to the analogous within-series condition with the same
consequent. Thus, congruency in condition 2a (colors–spheres) was defined as it was in
condition 1b (spheres–spheres), and congruency in condition 2b (spheres–colors) was defined
as it was in condition 1a (colors–colors). For example, for the conditional “If patch E is blue,
then sphere 6 is large”, the congruent direction is left-to-right.
The order of the conditionals was individually randomized, with one conditional presented
per page.
8.3 Results and discussion
8.3.1 Indeterminate responses
To test our if-heuristic override hypothesis, we first compared the rate of determinate versus
indeterminate responses in the within-series versus between-series test condition. Figure 8.2
displays the full distribution of the individual response proportions separated for within-series
condition (upper row) and between-series condition (lower row). As expected, the rate of in-
determinate responses in the between-series condition outnumbered the rate of indeterminate
responses in the within-series condition almost 3 : 1. The results for the within-series condition
replicated those of Experiments 1 and 2. The observed rate of indeterminate responses was
13 percent (52 percent true and 35 percent false) and on the individual level 53 percent of
participants never chose the indeterminate response (3 percent never chose true and 10 percent
never chose false). For the between-series condition, the pattern was markedly different and,
as expected, the proportion of indeterminate response replicated the typical defective truth
table pattern (e.g., Schroyens, 2010): 38 percent indeterminate responses, 44 percent false
responses, and 18 percent true responses. On the individual level, only 30 percent never chose
the indeterminate response whereas 41 percent never chose true and 17 percent never chose
false. In addition, for the between-series condition 15 percent of participants always responded
with the indeterminate response (7 percent always with false and 0 percent always with true),
whereas this rate was only 2 percent for the within-series condition (0 percent always with
false and 0 percent always with true).
To investigate this pattern further, we estimated a GLMM with the rate of indeterminate
responses versus other responses as dependent variable.10 The independent variables (i.e.,
fixed effects) were antecedent, a numerical variable from 1 to 14, centered at the midpoint
for the analysis; type, a mixed within–between factor with four levels derived from the group
factor and the relevance factor: (a) within-series colors, (b) within-series spheres, (c) between-
series colors–spheres, and (d) between-series spheres–colors; direction; distance; and their
interactions. Recall that the defective truth table pattern means that the rate of indeterminate
responses in the between-series condition should be a function of the truth of the antecedent.
Thus, we predicted that the slope in the between-series condition should significantly differ
10All tests for fixed effects for Experiment 3 are based on amodel without correlation among randomparameters,
due to numerical problems in obtaining 𝑝-values in the model with correlations.
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Figure 8.2: Histogram of individual response proportions of Experiment 3. The upper row
shows the response proportions for the within-series conditionals (which refer to the same
soritical series in both antecedent and consequent, and hence guarantee relevance) and the
lower row shows the between-series conditionals (which refer to different soritical series in
antecedent and consequent, with no guarantee of relevance).
from 0, and that the slope in the between-series conditions should be significantly steeper
than the slope in the within-series conditions.
The GLMM revealed the expected main effect of type, 𝜒2(3) = 54.09, 𝑝 < .0001. Inspec-
tion of all pairwise comparisons of the four means confirmed the predictions: the rate of
indeterminate responses was larger for the between-series conditionals (EMM = .24) than
for the within-series conditionals (EMM = .01). Neither levels (a) and (b) nor levels (c) and
(d) differed from each other, both 𝑝s > .98, whereas all other pairwise comparisons were
significant, all 𝑝s < .0001. We also found a main effect of direction, 𝜒2(1) = 13.38, 𝑝 = .0003,
which indicated that, overall, participants gave more indeterminate responses to incongruent
items (EMM = .09) than to congruent items (EMM = .04). This main effect was qualified by
a type × direction interaction, 𝜒2(3) = 32.16, 𝑝 < .0001, and a type × direction × distance
interaction, 𝜒2(3) = 8.80, 𝑝 = .03. Follow-up analysis on the latter interaction revealed that the
effect of direction was only significant for far patches in condition (a) (EMMcong = .01 versus
EMMincong = .05, 𝑧 = −5.22, 𝑝 < .0001) and near patches in condition (b) (EMMcong = .00
versus EMMincong = .05, 𝑧 = −3.16, 𝑝 = .02). The effect of direction did not reach significance
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Figure 8.3: Two-way interaction of type × direction for “Neither” versus other responses of
Experiment 3. The black lines show the predictions based on the fixed effects. The gray lines in
the background show the predictions of the individual random effects from all 116 participants;
these are plotted with 50 percent transparency so that darker lines represent more participants.
in the between-series conditions (c) (EMMcong = .29 versus EMMincong = .20, 𝑧 = 1.33,
𝑝 = .56) or (d) (EMMcong = .30 versus EMMincong = .19, 𝑧 = 1.69, 𝑝 = .32).
More importantly, the GLMM also provided evidence for the expected type × antecedent
interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 12.01, 𝑝 = .007, displayed in Figure 8.3. The visual impression from the
figure is very much in line with a defective truth table pattern for the between-series condition.
When moving to the “False” end of the scale—that is, to the right if the antecedent is a color as
in condition (c), and to the left if the antecedent is a sphere as in condition (d)—the probability
of an indeterminate response visibly increases. The antecedent slope differed significantly
from 0 in condition (d), 𝑏 = −0.11, 95% CI [−0.21, −0.02], although not in condition (c),
𝑏 = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.14]. In the within-series condition the slope in condition (a)
also differed significantly from 0, 𝑏 = 0.15, 95% CI [0.03, 0.28] (i.e., also tended to show the
defective truth table pattern, albeit less pronounced, as Figure 8.3 shows), but not in condition
(b), 𝑏 = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.14, 0.11]. In terms of differences between slopes, the slope in
condition (d) was significantly steeper than the slope in condition (a), 𝑧 = 3.32, 𝑝 = .005.
However, none of the remaining comparisons between slopes reached significance, |𝑧| < 2.2,
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𝑝 > .13. Thus, responses in the between-series conditions tended to conform to the defective
truth table pattern more than the responses in the within-series conditions (although not
all relevant comparisons were significant). None of the other effects of the GLMM reached
significance, largest 𝜒2(3) = 7.76, smallest 𝑝 = .05.
Taken together, these results show two things: (1) Guaranteed relevance provides an
important cue for participants to override the if-heuristic which leads to an overall very low
level of indeterminate responses. (2) In the absence of guaranteed relevance, the if-heuristic
produces a defective truth table pattern, where the rate of indeterminate responses appears to
be a function of antecedent position. In addition, the descriptive analysis slightly qualified the
support for our hypothesis. When the strong relevance cue was absent, there was a marked
increase in the rate of indeterminate responses, but also in the rate of “False” responses. This
suggests that participants are somewhat split whether or not conditionals in the between-series
condition were void or just false. This pattern is in line with recent research on the defective
truth table (e.g., Schroyens, 2010). Another possibility is that the increased proportion of
“False” responses is due to some participants in the between-series condition resorting to
conjunctive responses, a pattern often found with abstract conditionals (e.g., Evans et al., 2003;
Oberauer &Wilhelm, 2003).
8.3.2 “True” versus “False” responses
Mean response proportions of the “True” versus “False” judgments are displayed in Figure 8.4.
For the within-series conditions (top panels), the pattern appears to replicate those of Experi-
ments 1 and 2. For condition (a), the pattern seems to replicate the results from Experiment 1
almost exactly with the exception of one data point: the middle point for incongruent patches
with distance 3 seems too low. The pattern in condition (b) seems to match the results from
Experiment 2 almost exactly.
For the between-series condition (lower panels), the pattern appears to be markedly
different than for the within-series condition, with overall a considerably lower level of “True”
judgments. Nevertheless, two main trends still appear to be present, to wit, larger rates of
true judgments for congruent compared to incongruent conditionals, and visible consequent
slopes.11
Model selection. As in the analyses of the previous experiments, we compared three GLMMs:
one for HIT (i.e., fixed effects for direction, distance, consequent, type, and all interactions); a
consequentmodel (i.e., consequent, type, and their interaction); and an antecedent–consequent
model (i.e., antecedent, consequent, type, and their interactions). Based on the expected
differences between the within-series and between-series condition, we performed this analysis
separately for each condition. This decisionmade type a between-subjects factor with two levels
in each condition. Results are displayed in Table 8.1 and show the expected difference between
the two conditions. For the within-series condition, the HIT model provided, as expected,
the best account, ΔAIC > 150. For the between-series condition, the antecedent–consequent
model provided the best account, ΔAIC > 78.
Analysis of HIT model: Within-series condition. For the within-series conditions, our main
prediction was a replication of the pattern found in the previous experiment. In line with this,
we found support for the inferential strength hypothesis with both a main effect of direction,
𝜒2(1) = 25.49, 𝑝 < .0001, OR > 2100 (EMMcong = 1.00 versus EMMincong = .61), and a main
11Note again that congruency in the between-series condition is based on the position of the consequent.
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Figure 8.4: Data from Experiment 3 relevant to HIT predictions concerning “True” versus
“False” judgments (excluding all “Neither true nor false” responses) as a function of consequent
(on the 𝑥-axis), type, distance between antecedent and consequent, and direction.
Table 8.1: Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 3.
Model 𝐾𝑓 𝐾𝑟 LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
Within-series condition
HIT 16 8/28 −403.20 910.41 0.00 1175.09 22.14
Consequent 4 2/1 −677.46 1368.91 458.50 1404.54 251.59
Antecedent–consequent 8 4/6 −512.66 1061.33 150.92 1152.95 0.00
Between-series condition
HIT 16 8/28 −341.51 787.01 78.69 1034.43 240.47
Consequent 4 2/1 −404.85 823.70 115.38 857.00 63.04
Antecedent–consequent 8 4/6 −336.16 708.32 0.00 793.97 0.00
Note. See Table 6.2. As in Experiment 2, the apparent better performance of the antecedent–consequent model
compared to the HIT model for the within-series condition in terms of BIC is a consequence of the correlation
parameters among the random effects. When removing those, the HIT model provides the best account in terms
of both AIC, ΔAIC > 150, and BIC, ΔBIC > 95. For the between-series condition, removing the correlations does
not affect the ordering of the models in terms of their AIC or BIC performance.
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effect of distance 𝜒2(1) = 42.95, 𝑝 < .0001, OR > 24000, (EMM1 = 1.00 versus EMM3 = .32).
Again we did not find a direction × distance interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 0.00, 𝑝 = .95, but a type ×
direction interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 58.43, 𝑝 < .0001, and a type × direction × distance interaction,
𝜒2(1) = 12.22, 𝑝 = .0005. The last two effects indicate that the effect of direction and distance
differed between the spheres–spheres and colors–colors conditions (see supplemental materials
for details).
We also again found support for the belief bias effect, a significant type × consequent inter-
action, 𝜒2(1) = 102.11,𝑝 < .0001 (𝑏color = −5.99, 95%CI [−7.23, −4.75], versus 𝑏spheres = 1.86,
95% CI [0.96, 2.76]). There was also evidence for the validity × belief analogue, a significant
type × direction × consequent interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 11.51, 𝑝 = .0007. In the colors–colors
condition, the effect of consequent was less pronounced for congruent (𝑏 = −5.26, 95%
CI [−6.54, −3.98]) than for incongruent patches (𝑏 = −6.72, 95% CI [−8.22, −5.22]), in the
spheres–spheres condition the effect of consequent was absent for congruent patches (𝑏 = 0.55,
95% CI [−0.29, 1.40]) but it was clearly there for incongruent patches (𝑏 = 3.17, 95% CI
[1.83, 4.51]), and all slopes differed from each other (𝑝 < .03). We also found a main effect
of type, 𝜒2(1) = 14.28, 𝑝 = .0002, OR = 235, indicating that the rate of true judgments was
larger in the colors–colors condition (EMM = 1.00) than in the spheres–spheres condition
(EMM = .74). None of the remaining interactions reached significance, largest 𝜒2(1) = 1.2,
smallest 𝑝 = .29.
Analysis of HIT model: Between-series condition. For the between-series conditions, the results
were in line with the visual inspection. We observed an effect of direction, 𝜒2(1) = 4.79,
𝑝 = .03, OR = 12.36, (EMMcong = .28 versus EMMincong = .03) and a type × consequent
interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 20.41, 𝑝 < .0001 (𝑏colors–spheres = 0.44, 95% CI [0.10, 0.77], versus
𝑏spheres–colors = −0.56, 95% CI [−0.85, −0.28]). In addition, we found a main effect of type,
𝜒2(1) = 8.77, 𝑝 = .003, OR = 0.13, indicating that the rate of true judgments was larger in the
spheres–colors condition (EMM = .23) than in the colors–spheres condition (EMM = .04).
None of the remaining effects reached significance, largest 𝜒2(1) = 3.2, smallest 𝑝 = .07.
In conclusion, in Experiment 3 we set out to test the principle of relevant inference, by
pitting conditionals which refer to a single soritical series, whose relevance is guaranteed,
against conditionals which refer to two soritical series, where relevance is suppressed. We
predicted, and found, that when relevance was suppressed, the proportion of indeterminate
responses was substantially and significantly higher, increasing as the antecedent rank became
“falser,” conforming to the defective conditional pattern. In contrast, when the antecedent
and consequent were within a single series, we replicated the patterns found in Experiments 2
and 3.
9 Experiment 4
All previous experiments supported our principle of relevant inference, demonstrating that, un-
der conditions of guaranteed relevance, the defective truth table pattern disappears. Moreover,
Experiment 3 directly supported this principle by demonstrating that when this relevance was
defeated, responses relapsed to the defective truth table. Thus far, we supported our principle
of bounded inference by showing that factors hypothesized to affect the strength of inference
from antecedent to consequent also affected truth evaluation, and that the evaluation pattern
was subject to the same belief bias that affects other types of inference. Experiment 4 aimed to
provide a more direct support for the principle of bounded inference, by using a measure of
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participants’ subjective evaluations of bounded inference strength. Moreover, Experiment 4 is
the most direct test of the core principle of HIT, the inferentialist principle that truth evalua-
tions of conditionals are determined by the existence of an inferential connection between
antecedent and consequent.
In this experiment, we returned to the stimuli set used in Experiment 1 (where belief
bias was more in evidence), but added two direct measures: we asked participants to evaluate
the strength of the inference from antecedent to consequent, as well as their metacognitive
confidence in their response. The inference strength scale was borrowed from Elqayam et
al. (2015), and is suitable for directly measuring the strength of informal inference. Participants
are presented with the premise (in this case, the antecedent) and the conclusion (in this case,
the consequent), and asked to rate the extent to which the conclusion follows from the premise
on a scale from “Definitely does not follow” to “Definitely follows.”
The metacognitive confidence scale was inspired by recent work on metacognition and
reasoning, sometimes dubbed “meta-reasoning” (see, e.g., Ackerman & Thompson, 2015,
2017, 2018; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). This research domain, which
branches off dual process theories, explores the psychological on/off switch for effortful, Type
2 processing. We will have more to say about metacognition and meta-reasoning in the
general discussion; for now we just note that meta-reasoning research inspired our work in
two ways. First, it makes a firm distinction between direct judgments of inference such as
validity or strength (first-order measures), and confidence in those judgments (a second-order
measure). Second, it provided the scale for metacognitive confidence, which we needed in
order to estimate when the inference is considered to be satisficing, or strong enough. Recall
that, according to HIT’s principle of bounded inference, the inference from antecedent to
consequent should be strong enough for a conditional to be evaluated as true. Consequently, we
needed to ask for both inference strength judgments and metacognitive confidence, in order
to capture the “strong” element as well as the “enough” element of this principle, respectively.
9.1 Predictions
We had four sets of predictions: first, we predicted replication of the pattern established in the
three previous experiments, and especially Experiment 1. We also had three graded sets of
predictions for the added variable that measure bounded inference, that is, inference strength
and metacognitive confidence.
Replication. For the truth evaluation task, our predictions were essentially the same as in
Experiment 1. We predicted a replication of the inferential strength effect, articulated as
main effects of direction and distance. We left the distance × direction interaction again as an
exploratory hypothesis. We also predicted a consequent effect (our belief bias analogue). As a
minor prediction, we predicted a consequent × direction effect, a replication of the same effect
from Experiments 1 and 2. As before, this prediction is less firm because the believability ×
validity interaction is not universal in belief bias.
Bounded inference. HIT’s central thesis is that the mechanism that underlies the truth evalua-
tion of conditionals is, by default, relevant, bounded inference from antecedent to consequent.
In this experiment, bounded inference was measured by the twin parameters of inference
strength judgment and metacognitive confidence. There are three graded interpretations of
this thesis. If HIT is right, then truth evaluation should mimic the same response pattern
as the variable measuring bounded inference, that is, inference strength and metacognitive
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confidence, providing a basic level of support for the thesis. Hence, we expected that inference
strength judgment and metacognitive confidence would reflect the same pattern as truth
evaluation. Specifically, we predicted inference strength judgment to be sensitive to distance
and direction (the factors manipulating inferential strength) in the same way as truth eval-
uation; and we expected both inference strength judgment and metacognitive confidence
to be sensitive to consequent effects, again in the same way as truth evaluation. We left any
interaction effects between direction and distance as an exploratory hypothesis. As a minor
prediction, we predicted a consequent × direction effect on inference strength judgment.12
To provide stronger support for HIT, our bounded inference variables (i.e., inference
strength judgment and metacognitive confidence) should also predict truth evaluation, in a
model in which truth evaluation is the criterion and all other variables—distance, direction,
consequent, inference strength judgment, and metacognitive confidence— are predictors.
The bounded inference variables should be significant predictors of truth evaluation, thus
providing an intermediate level of support for HIT. At the strongest level of support, inference
strength judgment and metacognitive confidence should be the only significant predictors in
such a model, superseding all other predictors such as direction and distance, hence showing
that bounded inference is the only explanation for truth evaluation.
9.2 Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty-three participants were recruited the same way as in the previous
experiments. We used the same validation measures and exclusion criteria as in Experiment 2,
which left us with 99 participants.13 These participants spent on average 502 seconds on the
experiment (SD: 186 s). Seventy-five of them had a university education and 24 had only a
high school or secondary school education. Their mean age was 41 years (±11).
Design and materials
We used a trimmed-down version of the design from Experiment 1, with only the in-sight
visual condition, a single named color condition (blue), and with two levels of distance, 1 and
3, manipulated entirely within participants. Each participant was presented with a total of 14
conditionals. Antecedent patches were in position 3, 6, 9, or 12, and for each antecedent patch,
the consequents were +/−1 and +/−3 (with the exception of antecedent patches 3 and 12, for
which −3 and, respectively, +3 were impossible).
Participants were asked to complete two tasks, presented in counterbalanced order, so that
half of the participants completed the truth-evaluation task first (50 of the final participants),
and half of the participants completed the bounded inference task first (49 of the final partic-
ipants). The truth-evaluation task was identical to the one in Experiment 1, with the same
soritical color series. Participants were first given a practice item, then presented with the set
of 14 items, each on a separate page, in an individually randomized order.
The bounded inference task, presented separately, included two questions for each item:
inference strength judgment and metacognitive confidence. The inference strength task
12We expected metacognitive confidence only to be affected by intuitive factors (in our task, consequent effects),
since it is well-established in the metacognition literature that time-free confidence ratings (“Final Judgment
of Confidence”) are only sensitive to those factors (e.g., Thompson et al., 2013; Thompson & Johnson, 2014;
Thompson et al., 2011).
13In relation to Experiment 2, the 𝑁 = 99 is consistent with the 2.5 times rule of Simonsohn (2015) for
replication studies.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
The following statement refers to the series of patches shown above.
Suppose patch number 3 is blue. Does it then follow:
Patch number 2 is blue.
Definitely
does not Follows very Follows Follows to Follows Follows very Definitely
follow weakly weakly some degree strongly strongly follows
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
In providing my answer to the above question I felt:
Certain I’m
Guessing Fairly certain right
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Figure 9.1: Inference strength judgment and metacognitive confidence task example.
presented participants with the antecedent of the conditional as a premise, and asked them to
evaluate how strongly the consequent followed on a fully labeled 7-point Likert-type scale:
Definitely does not follow, Follows very weakly, Follows weakly, Follows to some degree, Follows
strongly, Follows very strongly, and Definitely follows. This question was followed by the
metacognitive question directly underneath, taken fromThompson et al. (2011): “In providing
my answer to the above question I felt: . . . ,” which in turn was followed by a partially-labeled
7-point Likert-type scale with the labels Guessing, Fairly certain, and Certain I’m right in the
extreme left, midpoint, and extreme right, respectively.14 Following a separate practice item,
the 14 test items were presented, each on a separate page, in an individually randomized order;
see Figure 9.1 for an example.
9.3 Results and discussion
A first analysis showed that the order in which participants worked on the two tasks did not
affect the results (i.e., when including order in the models reported below, no effect involving
order reached significance). Furthermore, for some GLMMs excluding order led to a better
model fit than including order, indicating that models including order did not converge to
the maximum likelihood estimates (for LMMs—see below—the difference in model fit was
very small and not significant). Consequently, all results reported below are based on models
without order as factor.
9.3.1 Indeterminate responses
14Note that this is not the full Thompson two-response paradigm, in which participants first provide a quick
response, which is then followed by a second response with more time for effortful processing; we only adopted
the confidence question as a measure of satisficing. We will return to this issue in the general discussion.
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Figure 9.2: Histogram of individual response proportions of Experiment 4.
Overall, participants classified 59.5 percent of the conditionals as true, 26.8 percent as false,
and 13.6 percent as neither true nor false. In line with the previous results, only one of the 99
participant always respondedwith “Neither true nor false” while 38 participants never used this
response (zero participants always responded with “True” and two never, and one participant
always responded with “False” and eleven never). Figure 9.2 displays the distribution of the
individual response proportions; these are very similar to the results from Experiments 1 and 2
as well as from the inferential connection condition of Experiment 3.
9.3.2 “True” versus “False” responses
Figure 9.3 displays the rate of “True” versus “False” responses. The pattern of results clearly
resembles the pattern of results from Experiment 1, showing a strong consequent effect as well
as an effect of distance. Only the effect of direction seems absent or at least strongly attenuated.
We again start this section with comparing the HIT model with competitor models before
testing the presence of the predicted effects.
Model selection. Table 9.1 shows the GLMM model selection result for the three models
corresponding to the main accounts. As before, the HIT model provides the best account,
ΔAIC > 134. This strongly indicates, once again, that only when considering all variables
deemed relevant by HIT can a model provide an adequate account of “True” versus “False”
judgments.
Analysis of HIT model. Regarding the effect of the inferential strength parameters—distance
and direction—we did not see an effect of direction, 𝜒2(1) = 2.30, 𝑝 = .13.15 But we again
found a main effect of distance, 𝜒2(1) = 60.51, 𝑝 < .0001. Patches with distance 1 were more
likely to be judged true (EMM1 = 1.00) than patches with distance 3 (EMM3 = .49), OR >
1000. In addition, we now found a direction × distance interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 9.73, 𝑝 = .002.
15Just as for Experiment 2, we were unable to reliably obtain 𝑝-values for the model including correlations
among random slopes. Consequently, this section is based on a model without correlations among random slopes.
See Table 4 in the supplemental materials for full results.
37
Consequent
M
ea
n 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 “T
ru
e”
 ju
dg
m
en
ts
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 Distance: 1
Direction: congruent
bluer 4 7.5 11 greener
Distance: 3
Direction: congruent
bluer 4 7.5 11 greener
Distance: 1
Direction: incongruent
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1Distance: 3
Direction: incongruent
Figure 9.3: Data from Experiment 4 relevant to HIT predictions concerning “True” versus
“False” judgments (excluding all “Neither true nor false” responses) as a function of consequent
(on the 𝑥-axis), distance between antecedent and consequent, and direction. (Figure 9 in the
supplemental materials is a version of this figure that includes the “Neither true nor false”
responses.)
However, this interaction only partly supported the predictions. There was no support for
the predicted differential effect of distance within each level of direction. Instead, there was a
strong effect of direction for patches with distance 1, 𝑧 = 2.14, 𝑝 = .03, OR > 1000 (although
Table 9.1: Model comparison of GLMMs on “True” versus “False” responses for Experiment 4.
Model 𝐾𝑓 𝐾𝑟 LL AIC ΔAIC BIC ΔBIC
HIT 8 8/28 −311.59 711.17 0.00 934.99 18.53
Consequent 2 2/1 −492.28 994.56 283.38 1019.99 103.53
Antecedent–consequent 4 4/6 −408.62 845.24 134.07 916.46 0.00
Note. See Table 6.2. As for Experiment 2, the apparent better performance of the antecedent–consequent model in
terms of BIC is solely an effect of the correlation among random slopes. After removing those, HIT provides the
best account in terms of both AIC, ΔAIC > 162, and BIC, ΔBIC > 121.
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Figure 9.4: Responses to the inference strength measure and corresponding LMM predictions
as a function of variables relevant to HIT. Individual data points are plotted with 70 percent
transparency and with jitter added. Gray areas indicate 95 percent confidence bands.
EMMcong = EMMincong = 1.00), but no effect of direction for patches with distance 3, 𝑧 = 0.08,
𝑝 = .94, OR = 1.20 (EMMcong = .51 and EMMincong = .47).
In support of our belief bias hypothesis, we found a strong main effect of consequent,
𝜒2(1) = 112.17, 𝑝 < .0001, 𝑏 = −5.61, 95% CI [−4.08, −7.14], replicating the pattern observed
in Experiments 1 and 2 and in the within-series condition of Experiment 3. We also found
a consequent × distance interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 7.20, 𝑝 = .007 (supplemental materials Figure
10). Consequent effects were strongest (i.e., largest absolute value) for patches with distance 3,
𝑏 = −6.61, 95% CI [−8.51, −4.71], and less strong (i.e., smaller absolute value) for patches with
distance 1, 𝑏 = −4.61, 95% CI [−6.05, −3.18].
9.3.3 Inference strength measure
For the inference strength measure we predicted the same pattern of results as for the truth
judgments. Figure 9.4 depicts the data and reveals a very similar pattern as the one seen in
Figure 9.3.16 One can clearly see an effect of consequent which appears stronger for patches
16For this and the analysis of metacognitive judgments, we included all trials, even those for which participants
decided that the conditional was neither true nor false. We did not see any reason to exclude trials here. However,
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with distance 3 than for patches with distance 1. In addition to this, judgments of inference
strength appear to be stronger for congruent patches (top row) than for incongruent patches
(bottom row). Further inspection also suggests a similar nonlinear relationship. In the GLMM,
this nonlinearity in the effect of consequent was captured by the logistic linking function, but
this solution is not possible for linear mixed models (LMMs; Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008).
We therefore tried to capture the nonlinearity with a simple quadratic effect of consequent in
addition to the linear effect of consequent. As the comparison of observed and predicted data
in Figures 9.4 and 9.5 shows, this was sufficient to adequately capture the trends in the data.
We entered the individual responses to the inference strength question to an LMM with
fixed effects for direction, distance, consequent (linear and quadratic), as well as their inter-
actions. The results showed that all effects, with the exception of the three-way interaction
of direction, distance, and the quadratic component of consequent (𝜒2(1) = 0.99, 𝑝 = .32),
reached significance, smallest 𝜒2(1) = 5.08, largest 𝑝 = .02. See supplemental materials Table 5
for full results. The corresponding model predictions are plotted in Figure 9.4 as black lines
on top of the data points.
We also replicated the truth judgment pattern for inference strength judgments, thus
supporting our inferential strength hypothesis: congruent patches received stronger inference
strength ratings than incongruent patches, EMM = 4.73 versus EMM = 3.91, and patches with
distance 1 received stronger inference strength ratings than patches with distance 3, EMM
= 4.83 versus EMM = 3.82. Furthermore, we replicated the belief bias effect and found a
clear linear effect of consequent, 𝑏 = −0.37, 95% CI [−0.43, −0.31]. In line with the visual
impression, we found a quadratic effect of consequent, 𝑏 = 0.025, 95% CI [0.016, 0.034].
Finally, we replicated the analogue to the believability × validity interaction: the (linear)
effect of consequent was strongest for incongruent patches with distance 3, 𝑏 = −0.58, 95%
CI [−0.68, −0.48], which differed from all other effects of consequent, smallest 𝑧 = 4.6, all
𝑝s < .0001. The next strongest effect was for incongruent patches with distance 1, 𝑏 = −0.36,
95% CI [−0.42, −0.30], which differed from the effect for congruent patches with distance 3,
𝑏 = −0.24, 95% CI [−0.34, −0.13], 𝑧 = 2.57, 𝑝 = .03, but not from the effect for congruent
patches with distance 1, 𝑏 = −0.31, 95% CI [−0.37, −0.25], 𝑧 = 1.93, 𝑝 = .11. The two effects
for congruent patches did not differ from each other, 𝑧 = 1.53, 𝑝 = .13.
9.3.4 Metacognitive confidence
For themetacognitive confidence judgmentswe only predicted effects of consequent. Figure 9.5
depicts the data; an eyeball test suggests somewhat weaker effects compared to those seen
in Figures 9.3 and 9.4, although the effect of consequent still seems strong. To statistically
assess this pattern, we followed the same approach as for the inference strength measure and
estimated an LMM with the metacognitive judgments as dependent variable and fixed effects
for direction, distance, consequent (linear and quadratic), as well as their interactions (see
supplemental materials Table 6 for full results). This analysis again supported our bounded
inference prediction at the basic level, showing a parallel pattern to that of truth evaluation. It
revealed the predicted belief bias effect, a main effect of consequent (linear component),
𝑏 = −0.10, 95% CI [−0.13, −0.07], 𝜒2(1) = 31.16, 𝑝 < .0001. In addition, we found a
as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, excluding the indeterminate responses makes the analysis more similar to
the one reported for the “True” versus “False” judgments. Consequently, we repeated both analyses excluding the
indeterminate responses which led to the same pattern of significant and non-significant results as reported here.
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Figure 9.5: Responses to the metacognitive confidence measure and corresponding LMM
predictions. NB: Mean responses (in the dashed lines) are hardly visible because they are so
well-aligned with the predictions (in the solid black lines).
main effect of the quadratic component of consequent, 𝑏 = 0.015, 95% CI [0.005, 0.025],
𝜒2(1) = 31.16, 𝑝 < .0001.
We also found evidence for an effect of inferential strength on metacognitive judgments: a
main effect of direction, 𝜒2(1) = 8.57, 𝑝 = .003, indicating that congruent patches received
stronger certainty ratings, EMM = 5.69, than incogruent patches, EMM = 5.44, as well as a
main effect of distance, 𝜒2(1) = 21.96, 𝑝 < .0001, indicating that consequent patches with
distance 1, EMM1 = 5.74, received stronger certainty ratings than congruent patches with
distance 3, EMM3 = 5.38. Finally, we found a weak interaction of direction with the quadratic
component of consequent, 𝜒2(1) = 4.16, 𝑝 = .03, indicating that the quadratic effect is absent
for congruent patches, 𝑏 = 0.008, 95% CI [−0.003, 0.018], but stronger for incongruent ones,
𝑏 = 0.023, 95% CI [0.013, 0.033]. As in the truth judgments and inference strength measure,
this latter interaction can be interpreted as a validity × believability analogue.
9.3.5 Combined model
Recall that in Section 9.1 we introduced three possible levels of support for our bounded
inference hypothesis: basic, in which the bounded inference variables, inference strength and
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Figure 9.6: “True” versus “False” judgments (excluding all “Neither true nor false” responses)
as a function of inference strength judgment and metacognitive confidence.
metacognitive confidence, mimic the pattern found for truth evaluations; intermediate, in
which these bounded inference variables also significantly predict the truth evaluation pattern;
and the strongest level, in which they do so exclusively. To test if the data supported our
bounded inference prediction at the intermediate or even strongest level, we tested if inference
strength judgment and metacognitive confidence predict truth judgments. Figure 9.6 shows
those relationships. It is clear that for both variables an increase is strongly associated with a
higher probability of responding with “True.” To test if these effects can explain the effects of
the variables deemed relevant by HIT (in a statistical sense), we combined each of the two
variables separately with the HITmodel for truth judgments (a joint model with both variables
did not converge). In contrast to the other tests reported in this manuscript, we were unable
to employ likelihood ratio tests and had to resort to Wald tests instead (Fox, 2008).
Inference strength. We estimated a GLMMwith truth judgments as dependent variable and
fixed effects for direction, distance, consequent, and their interactions plus a fixed effect for
inference strength (after centering at the midpoint of the scale). As expected, we found a
strong effect of inference strength judgment, 𝑏 = 9.87, 95% CI [4.80, 14.95], 𝜒2(1) = 14.54,
𝑝 = .0001, thus providing support for our bounded inference hypothesis at the intermediate
level. Inference strength judgment could however not explain all effects in the data, failing to
provide full support for our bounded inference hypothesis at the strongest level. However, the
effects were much attenuated, giving partial support to this level of the hypothesis. We did find
an effect of distance, 𝜒2(1) = 3.93, 𝑝 = .05, EMM1 = 1.00 versus EMM3 = 0.79, OR > 1000,
but the consequent effect was weaker, 𝑏 = −4.28, 95% CI [−7.84, −0.73], 𝜒2(1) = 5.58, 𝑝 = .02.
Moreover, none of the other effects reached significance, largest 𝜒2(1) = 1.35, smallest 𝑝 = .25
(see Table 7 in the supplementary materials for full results).
Metacognitive confidence. We estimated another GLMM on the truth judgments, but this
time we added a fixed effect for metacognitive judgment (centered). This analysis showed
the expected effect of metacognitive judgments, 𝑏 = 1.07, 95% CI [0.23, 1.91], 𝜒2(1) = 6.25,
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𝑝 = .01, again providing support for our bounded inference hypothesis at the intermediate
level. However, this effect was unable to fully explain the other effects. We still found effects
of consequent, 𝑏 = −4.42, 95% CI [−6.32, −2.52], 𝜒2(1) = 20.83, 𝑝 < .0001, distance 𝜒2(1) =
10.16, 𝑝 = .001, EMM1 = 1.00 versus EMM3 = 0.57, OR > 1000, and a direction × distance
interaction, 𝜒2(1) = 7.79, 𝑝 = .005. In addition we now also found a three-way interaction of
consequent × direction × distance, 𝜒2(1) = 5.29, 𝑝 = .02 (see Figure 11 in the supplementary
materials for a depiction of this interaction and Table 8 for full results). Thus, our bounded
inference hypothesis was only partly supported at the strongest level.
In sum, the pattern of truth evaluations in Experiment 4 broadly replicated the one found
in Experiment 1, with a low prevalence of indeterminate responses supporting our if-heuristic
override hypothesis. Although there was no main effect of direction, we did find the usual
distance effects, as well as a direction × distance interaction, with some support for the
inferential strength hypothesis. We also supported the belief bias hypothesis via an effect of
believability (consequent) as well as a validity × belief (direction × consequent) interaction.
Furthermore, we tested a novel hypothesis unique to this experiment, the bounded inference
hypothesis, and fully supported it at the basic and the intermediate level, and partly at the
strongest level. Judgments of inference strength and metacognitive confidence displayed
the same pattern as truth evaluations; and combined models showed that each of these two
additional measures were strong and significant predictors of truth evaluation, and that some
of the other predictors were attenuated (although this worked better for inference strength
judgment than for metacognitive confidence).
10 General discussion
In this paper, we presented HIT, a new theory of conditionals drawing on philosophical and
psychological insights. According to this theory, people judge the truth value of a conditional
by assessing the strength of the inferential connection between its antecedent and consequent,
where the inferential connection may consist of any combination of deductive, inductive, and
abductive steps. At the processing level, HIT postulates a dual processing framework, in which
both intuitive, resource-frugal processes (Type 1) and effortful processes (Type 2) play a role.
We proposed that people construct a relevant mental representation, which by default is the
one in which there is an inferential relation between antecedent and consequent (principle of
relevant inference). This relation need only be strong enough, in the sense of being subjectively
supported (principle of bounded inference). People judge the conditional as true when there
is a strong enough inferential connection between antecedent and consequent; false when
the connection is weak or there is an argument from the antecedent to the negation of the
consequent; and neither true nor false when there is no inferential connection at all, that
is, when relevance cues fail. Because false antecedent cases tend to fall in the third category,
HIT is able to reconcile our expectation of an inferential relation between antecedent and
consequent with the accumulated psychological evidence for the defective truth table.
To test HIT, we designed a novel experimental task, the soritical truth table task, presenting
it to a total of 893 participants across four experiments. The task was specifically designed to
guarantee relevance of the consequent to the antecedent even when the antecedent is false,
thus overriding the if-heuristic (the attentional cue which focuses speakers’ attention on the
antecedent being true), and circumventing the defective truth table response pattern. We
varied parameters pertaining to inference strength such as distance between the stimuli and the
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Table 10.1: Summary of main results from Experiments 1–4
Hypothesis Effects HIT prediction Experiment
1 2 3R 4A 4B 4C
If-heuristic Indeterminate Small proportion of " " " " NA NA
override responses indeterminate responses
Direction Congruent > incongruent " " " % " "Infer-
ence
strength Distance Near > far " " " " " "
Belief bias Consequent True > False " " " "
𝑏
"
𝑏
"
(belief bias 1)
Consequent × Stronger effect of conse-
𝑐
"
𝑐 𝑑
"
𝑑 𝑒
"
𝑒 𝑓
"
𝑓 𝑔
"
𝑔 ℎ
"
ℎ
validity quent when direction
(belief bias 2) and distance provide no
reliable cues
Notes. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 measured truth evaluation. Predictions for Experiment 3 are only for the
within-series condition where relevance is guaranteed (indicated here as 3R). Experiment 4 measured
truth evaluation (4A), judgment of inference strength (4B), and metacognitive confidence (4C). Green
checkmarks indicate support from the data, the red cross indicates lack of support; 𝑎: effect of direction
for distance 1, but no effect of direction for distance 3; 𝑏: linear and quadratic; 𝑐: consequent × direction
× color; 𝑑: consequent × direction; consequent × direction × distance; 𝑒: type × direction × consequent;
𝑓: consequent × distance; 𝑔: consequent × direction × distance; ℎ: consequent × direction (quadratic).
direction of inference. Participants were given the usual three response options, “True,” “False,”
and “Neither true nor false.” Additionally, in Experiment 3 we directly manipulated relevance,
using a variation of the task inwhich participants needed to evaluate conditionalswithin- versus
between-soritical series. Experiment 4 also measured inference strength and metacognitive
confidence, designed to tap directly into the strength of the bounded inference from antecedent
to consequent. Table 10.1 sums up our main findings across the four experiments.
HIT predicts a unique response pattern, much of which was strongly supported by our
data. First, since the soritical truth table task guarantees relevance, we predicted a massive
majority of determinate (“True,” “False”) responses. That was also what we found, which
supported our if-heuristic override hypothesis. Only aminority of the responses, and, evenmore
importantly, a very small percentage of the responses to conditionals with false antecedents,
were indeterminate—this, in stark contrast to the usual findings in classical truth table tasks,
the defective truth table, in which indeterminate responses to false antecedent cases tend
to be prevalent. We also found that when the task we designed undermined relevance (in
Experiment 3), participants reverted to the defective truth table pattern. Furthermore, our
results supported the inferential strength hypothesis, with effects of distance and direction in
all four experiments.
Perhaps our most striking finding is the belief bias analogue which we predicted and which
the data strongly supported. If conditionals are indeed inferential, they should display the same
pattern found to hold for almost any type of inference, be it deductive or non-deductive; that is,
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they should display belief bias, the tendency to judge an inference based on the believability of
the conclusion. Accordingly, we predicted a main effect of the believability of the consequent,
analogous to the main effect of conclusion believability in classic belief bias. This effect
replicated strongly and consistently across all four experiments. We also predicted, and
observed, an interaction effect between consequent position and factors relating to inferential
strength, viz., distance, direction, or both. This effect is analogous to the validity × believability
interaction in syllogistic belief bias. These results provided conceptual replication across
the four experiments, although with some variations, a variability consistent with the extant
literature on belief bias, in which the believability × validity effect of belief bias is not quite as
robust as the main effect of believability.
Lastly and importantly, in Experiment 4 we directly tested the core idea of HIT, according
to which inferential connections determine truth evaluations of conditionals. We also tested
the idea of bounded inference—that these connections need only be strong enough in the
sense of being subjectively supported. We postulated three levels of support for the principle
of bounded inference (the results for the relevant variables are depicted in Table 10.1): basic,
in which the pattern for the bounded inference variables mimics that of truth evaluation;
intermediate, in which bounded inference variables predict truth evaluation; and strongest,
in which they do so exclusively. We found full support for the basic and intermediate levels,
and partial support for the strongest level: the effects of other predictors attenuated when
inference strength, but not when metacognitive confidence, was in the model. This may
be due to the fact that we were unable to test both inference strength and metacognitive
confidence in the same model. Another possible explanation is that we have not used the
full meta-reasoning paradigm developed by Thompson and colleagues (e.g., Ackerman &
Thompson, 2015; Thompson et al., 2011). Perhaps a combination of metacognitive measures
would hit closer to the mark. We leave such exploration to future work.
In conclusion, our findings provide extensive, robust, and consistent support for HIT.
The strength of inference from antecedent to consequent clearly has a major role to play
in how we evaluate the truth of conditionals. We do not claim that this is all there is to
evaluating conditionals: recall that some of the effects in Experiment 2 were attenuated, and
that some predictors in Experiment 4 still played a role even when inference strength judgment
or metacognitive confidence were in the model. We cannot entirely rule out factors beside
inferential connections, but what we can say with confidence is that such factors cannot explain
away our findings in any significant way. In particular, the pervasive and strong belief bias
analogue, which can only be predicted and explained by a theory which regards conditionals
as subject to inferential connections, provides strong psychological validation of our theory.
10.1 HIT, the Equation, and the New Paradigm
Weare by nomeans the first to suggest that natural language conditionals embody a relationship
between antecedent and consequent. We have already reviewed HIT’s predecessor in the
philosophical literature, inferentialism as formalized by Krzyżanowska et al. (2014). Within
psychology, related ideas include Cheng and Holyoak’s (e.g., 1985) pragmatic reasoning
schemas, one of which features causal-temporal relations between antecedent and consequent.
Some of the work inmental model theory on spatial and temporal relations within conditionals
touches on the idea that the antecedent should be related to the consequent (e.g., Juhos, Quelhas,
& Johnson-Laird, 2012). Moreover, the idea takes center stage in theories of causal conditionals,
especially those that employ causal Bayes nets (Hall, Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2016; Oaksford
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& Chater, 2013, 2014). Ali, Chater, and Oaksford (2011) refer approvingly to the position of
Barwise and Perry (1983) that causal relations are at the semantic core of the conditional, and
their results give some support to this view (see also Fernbach & Erb, 2013). Such theories
strongly endorse the idea of inferential connections between antecedent and consequent,
especially in the context of causal relations. How exactly inference of causal connections
between antecedent and consequent fits into the larger picture of inferential connection is
another important question still awaiting future work. Our soritical truth table task draws on
abstract materials, in which the inferential connection is non-causal; it would be interesting to
compare this to performance on an analogous causal task.
One possible interpretation is that causal Bayes nets can explain distance effects as a
transitive chain from patch to adjacent patch, in which participants first infer from, say,
patch number 1 to patch number 2, and then from patch number 2 to patch number 3.17
Such chains may be driven by causality, but they may also be driven by inference. This
(non-causal) interpretation of causal Bayes nets makes it even closer to HIT; indeed, HITmight
be considered as much a specific articulation of causal Bayes nets as it is of the suppositional
conditional.
Causal Bayes nets also make a good starting point for discussing the role of HIT within the
broader framework of the New Paradigm in psychology of reasoning. We see HIT as falling
squarely within the New Paradigm, as HIT has a natural affinity to theories of conditionals
within this family, such as the psychological suppositional conditional and causal Bayes nets
analyses of conditionals. The informal type of inference postulated by HIT, in which inferential
connections only need be strong enough, also fits nicely with work on informal inference
within the New Paradigm (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Mercier & Sperber, 2011).
At this stage of theoretical development, we do not have an over-arching formal theory
(Marr’s computational level of analysis) to model the subjective strength of inferential con-
nections within conditionals. Hahn and Oaksford’s Bayesian model of informal inference is
a good candidate, but by no means the only one. It is entirely possible that different models
are needed to account for inferential connections within different types of conditionals. We
relegate to future work an investigation of this possibility. A further goal will be to link HIT
to approaches (e.g., the dual-source model of Singmann, Klauer, & Beller, 2016) that aim to
model the inference process underlying arguments involving conditionals.
Similarly, it is an open question what HIT’s inferential principles imply vis-à-vis the
Equation. Recent evidence suggests that the Equation does not hold for conditionals whose
antecedent is not positively probabilistically relevant to their consequent (Skovgaard-Olsen et
al., 2016). Whether and to what extent the Equation holds under different types of inferential
connections still needs to be explored. We flag this here as another avenue for future research,
though see Douven (2017c) for some first thoughts on what inferentialists might want to say
about the Equation.
On the processing side (Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis), HIT takes as a departure point
HypotheticalThinkingTheory. This dual processingmodel is based on a default-interventionist
approach, rather than a parallel-competitive one (Evans, 2007b). The main difference between
these models of dual processing is the question of whether Type 1 processes precede Type 2
processes (default-interventionist), or both types of processes proceed in tandem from the
start (parallel-competitive). The evidence is equivocal and fraught with debate, for example
over the question of whether intuitions about logic and probability exist and, if they do exist, of
17We thank Mike Oaksford for this suggestion.
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how to interpret them (for the debate concerning logical intuitions see, e.g., De Neys, 2012; and
cf. Klauer & Singmann, 2013). Going into the debate in any detail is beyond the scope of this
work. For now we just note that, although HIT is compatible with the default-interventionist
model, it would be easy enough to fit it with the parallel-competitive model. For example,
the notion of default processes can be replaced with its closely related counterpart from
the parallel-competitive model, the concept of fast, shallow Type 2 processing (De Neys &
Glumicic, 2008). Similarly, the idea of intuitive logic can be easily subsumed—and even
further developed—under HIT’s suggestion that, by default, people interpret conditionals as
postulating an inferential connection between their antecedent and consequent, where that
connection may involve (but is not limited to) deductive, inductive, or abductive inference
(and even any combination of these).
This is also the place to note that, even within the New Paradigm, there is some debate over
the if-heuristic and how explanatory it can be considered to be (e.g., Oaksford & Stenning,
1992). One potential explanation of our findings is that the contrast class in our paradigm
is restricted to the other 13 stimuli in the series (be they color patches or spheres), whereas
in everyday conditionals this is not so obviously the case.18 However, note that the contrast
class in Experiment 3’s between-series conditions was also restricted (albeit to 27 other stimuli
rather than 13), yet relevance was still suppressed. We defer further exploration of this issue to
future work.
The design of Experiment 4 was partly inspired by another recent development within the
New Paradigm, research in metacognition and meta-reasoning (e.g., Ackerman &Thompson,
2015; Thompson et al., 2011, 2013). The departure point for meta-reasoning research is that
Type 2 processes require cognitive effort, whereas people tend to be cognitively lazy. The
question then arises what regulatory mechanism triggers this extra cognitive effort. Meta-
reasoning research focuses mainly on “Feeling of Rightness,” or FOR—the metacognitive
experience whose function is to signal when additional cognitive resources are necessary. FOR
is usually measured by asking participants how confident they are in their responses. This was
the measure that Experiment 3 borrowed from this line of research. Meta-reasoning research,
however, usually employs the “two-response paradigm”: participants are asked to provide
an initial fast response, followed by confidence rating, and then a slower, more considered
response to the same task, again followed by confidence rating. The term FOR is reserved for
the first confidence rating, whereas the final confidence rating is termed “Final Judgment of
Confidence”, or FJC (e.g., Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013).
We should clarify that, although we used a metacognitivemeasure, Experiment 4 did not
aim to explore a metacognitive research question. Metacognitive research is about regulatory
processes, whereas our research question focused on the diverse inferential connections that
may exist between a conditional’s antecedent and consequent, and on the nature of those
connections. Meta-reasoning inspired our work, providing a convenient measure, which
together with inference strength captured the essence of bounded inference. But we did not
employ the two-response paradigm, which was beside the point for the purposes of the current
study. Accordingly, we avoided using the terms associated with this paradigm (FOR, FJC),
referring instead to “metacognitive confidence” simpliciter. The nature of the metacognitive
processes underlying HIT is a pertinent research question. We have not addressed it at this
stage as it was beyond the scope of this study; it still awaits future work. Potential studies in this
vein must draw on the two-response paradigm, where both FOR and FJC can provide valuable
18We thank Mike Oaksford for this suggestion.
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clues to the nature of the processes underlying the appreciation of inferential connections
within conditionals. Another potentially useful angle, strongly related to satisficing, is the idea
of a “stopping rule” (Ackerman, 2014): the metacognitive mechanism which determines when
the goal of the inference has been attained.
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